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The (Un)Constitutionality of Section 632 of the Edge
Act: An Analysis Under Article III and Theories of
Protective Jurisdiction
Elizabeth R. Sheyn*
I. INTRODUCTION
Is a statute that establishes federal question jurisdiction over cases
with non-diverse parties and involving purely state law claims
constitutional? "The absence of diversity (and any other apparent
[A]rticle HI1 ground for jurisdiction) looks like an embarrassment to the
principle that Congress may not augment the jurisdictional scope of
[A]rticle lI.'-2 Despite this fact, federal courts have tacitly approved
Congress's authority to place all civil suits arising out of "transactions
involving international or foreign banking . . . or out of other
international or foreign financial operations" 3 in the federal courts.4
The Edge Act of 1919 established original federal district court
jurisdiction over the two types of suits mentioned above; any defendant
named in such a suit may remove the suit from state court to federal
* University of Chicago, B.A., 2005; University of Pennsylvania Law School, J.D., 2008. I
would like to thank Professor James E. Pfander for reading and offering suggestions regarding a
previous version of this article and Stephen R. Brown for giving me the idea for this article.
Thanks are also due to the staff of the Loyola University Chicago Law Journal for their hard
work on this article.
1. This constitutional provision places within the "judicial power" of the federal courts "all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under th[e] Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made.., under their Authority. ." U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1. Although this grant
of federal jurisdiction is in Article Il, section 2, clause 1, this article will generally use the
shorthand term "Article HI" in referring to this provision.
2. Scott A. Rosenberg, Note, The Theory of Protective Jurisdiction, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 933,
935 (1982).
3. 12 U.S.C. § 632 (2006). Until relatively recently, courts generally did not rely on the "out
of other international or foreign financial operations" clause of section 632 to establish federal
jurisdiction. See infra Part IfI.C.l (addressing the federal courts' increasing reliance on this
provision). Thus, unless otherwise specified, when discussing the Edge Act, this article is
referring to the "arising out of transactions involving international or foreign banking" provision
of section 632.
4. See infra Parts HL.B.1, III.B.2 (discussing the courts' "broad" and "narrow" interpretations
of the section 632 jurisdictional grant, respectively).
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district court.5 Depending on how broadly a federal court interprets the
provisions of the Edge Act, it may provide a federal jurisdictional basis
for suits that ordinarily have none, such as suits involving purely state
law claims without any diversity of citizenship. 6  This result has been
borne out in several recent court decisions involving the extension of
federal question jurisdiction under the Edge Act to claims of state law
fraud, breach of contract, and wrongful termination in violation of state
public policy.7
Even more important than the proper statutory interpretation of the
Edge Act is the broader constitutional analysis of the Act.8 Courts have
recently been neglecting Article HI's limitations with respect to the
Edge Act (and potentially with respect to similar statutes). 9 Particularly
5. 12 U.S.C. § 632 (2006). The other provision of the Edge Act pertains to lawsuits to which
any Federal Reserve bank is a party. Such suits are also "deemed to arise under the laws of the
United States, and the district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction of all
such suits." Id. Moreover, "any Federal Reserve bank which is a defendant in any such suit may,
at any time before the trial thereof, remove such suit from a [s]tate court into the district court of
the United States for the proper district by following the procedure for the removal of causes
otherwise provided by law." Id.
6. See Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The "Technicalities" of Edge Act Jurisdiction: Advocating for the
Federal Courts' Adoption of and Adherence to a Uniform and Narrow Interpretation of 12 U.S.C.
§ 632, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1461823 (proposing a uniform and narrow
standard for interpreting the Edge Act of 1919); Michael C. Lasky & Sean P. Cameron, The Cutting
Edge: A Non-Traditional Basis for Federal Jurisdiction Under the Edge Act, METROPOLITAN
CORP. COUNS., Apr. 2009, at 50, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/
pdf/2009/April/50.pdf.
[Clourts interpret section 632 broadly and routinely grant jurisdiction pursuant to it
even in cases based on state law causes of action and where the international or foreign
banking activity is not central to the case. Thus, any element of international finance-
however remote or marginal-will satisfy the statute.
Id.; see also Steven M. Davidoff, Section 632: An Expanded Basis of Federal Jurisdiction for
National Banks, 123 BANKING L.J. 687, 688 (2006).
[T]he scope of national banks' ability to access federal courts by invoking [s]ection
632 is clearer, and perhaps more broader [sic], than ever. National banks should
acquaint themselves and make use of this open doorway to fulfil[l] [sic] [s]ection 632's
potential for the more effective resolution of international or foreign banking and
financial disputes.
7. See, e.g., Burgos v. Citibank, N.A., 432 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that a
contractual agreement between the consumer and the bank arose out of "traditional banking
activity"); Sollitt v. KeyCorp, No. 1:09-CV-43, 2009 WL 367494, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 11,
2009) (finding the state law wrongful discharge claim "integrally tied to banking activity" to
merit federal question jurisdiction); Warter v. Boston Sec., S.A., No. 03-81026, 2004 WL
691787, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2004) (finding that wire transfers and investment advice
constitute "international banking activities," thus conferring jurisdiction on the federal district
court under the Edge Act).
8. See Sheyn, supra note 6 (offering a proposed interpretation of section 632 of the Edge Act).
9. See, e.g., Unicover Corp. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 859 F. Supp. 1437, 1442 (D. Wyo. 1994)
(recognizing that "[tihe district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising
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during periods of financial uncertainty and bank failures, when issues
concerning the federal jurisdiction of lawsuits against or implicating
banks and other financial institutions come to the fore, courts must
evaluate and resolve the question of the constitutionality of the Edge
Act.
This article argues that section 632 of the Edge Act is likely
unconstitutional because it does not fit within Article III's traditional
bounds of federal question jurisdiction. For example, the Supreme
Court has declared that a jurisdictional statute that is nearly identical to
the Edge Act exceeds the limits of Article 111.10 Additionally, none of
the three recognized theories of "protective jurisdiction""1 fully apply to
the Edge Act-and even if one did, the Court has not yet legitimized
protective jurisdiction and is unlikely to do so in the near future. 12
Part II of this article describes Article III federal question jurisdiction
and the three theories of protective jurisdiction. Part III introduces the
Edge Act, with Part HLI.A describing its historical context, Part I1.B
discussing the modern interpretations (broad and narrow) of the Act,
under any Act of Congress relating to the postal service" (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1339 (2006)); FDIC
v. Huntington Towers, Ltd., 443 F. Supp. 316, 319 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding that the enactment
of 12 U.S.C. § 1819, which provides that "all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity to
which the [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)] is a party shall be deemed to arise
under the laws of the United States," 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A) (2006) (emphasis added), was
within Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution).
10. See infra notes 203-209 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's decision in Mesa
v. California).
11. Stated very simply, protective jurisdiction is "jurisdiction over cases (1) in federal court
(2) between non-diverse parties (3) governed by nonfederal rules of decision . Rosenberg,
supra note 2, at 936. Put another way:
[T]he theory of protective jurisdiction begins by identifying a field of regulatory
interest over which Congress may exercise broad legislative power. The theory
suggests that Congress may have authority to protect an area of federal interest from
potentially hostile state court adjudication by shifting the litigation into the
presumptively more friendly confines of a federal court, perhaps even where it fails to
regulate the field through the passage of rules of federal substantive law to govern the
disputes.
James E. Pfander, The Tidewater Problem: Article III and Constitutional Change, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1925, 1927 (2004). The theory of protective jurisdiction was originally introduced
by Professors Paul J. Mishkin and Herbert Wechsler. See Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal
"Question" in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 184-96 (1953) (postulating that "the
purpose of such jurisdiction would be the protection of some congressionally favored interest by
exploiting the institutional differences between the federal and state courts"); Herbert Wechsler,
Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216,
224-25 (1948) (stating that the power of Congress to confer federal judicial power "should
extend ... to all cases in which Congress has authority to make the rule to govern disposition of
the controversy" but is content to allow the states to provide the rule).
12. See infra notes 57, 78-81 and accompanying text (describing how "protective jurisdiction"
is indeed just a theory, as it has not been utilized in the court system).
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
and Part III.C summarizing the recent case law that has further
broadened the reach of Edge Act jurisdiction. Section ILI.D outlines a
statutory-level approach to interpreting and applying the Edge Act that
addresses the many problems associated with the federal courts'
currently maligned understanding and application of the provisions of
section 632. Finally, Part IV evaluates the constitutionality of the Edge
Act under Article III and theories of protective jurisdiction, concluding
that section 632 is likely unconstitutional or, at the very least, that its
current interpretation raises grave constitutional questions.
II. ARTICLE I JURISDICTION AND PROTECTIVE JURISDICTION
An introduction to Article HI (federal question) jurisdiction and the
three theories of protective jurisdiction is a necessary prerequisite to the
analysis of the constitutionality of the Edge Act. The following Parts
discuss these concepts, in turn.
A. Article III (Federal Question) Jurisdiction
Article HI, section 2, clause 1 of the United States Constitution places
within the "judicial power" of the federal courts "all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under th[e] Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made ... under their Authority." 13 The limited historical
evidence that exists regarding the meaning of the phrase "arising
under," as it was developed and used during the constitutional
convention debates, suggests "that Article IH was intended to allow for
federal jurisdiction over all cases involving the 'national peace [and]
harmony." ' 14 In other words, "matters internal to one state would be
beyond the reach of the federal judicial power (other than diversity
cases), but 'where the Union is in some measure concerned,' federal
jurisdiction would be appropriate."' 15 Some scholars argue that there "is
no limitation in Article III on what kind of law [arises under the
Constitution] or whether it has to be based on substantive rather than
procedural concerns .... There is no constitutional language, inside or
outside Article III, indicating [what] jurisdictional grant[s] [would be]
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
14. Eric J. Segall, Article III as a Grant of Power: Protective Jurisdiction, Federalism and the
Federal Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 361, 367 (2002) (quoting Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The
Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 542, 587 (1983)).
15. Id. at 368 (quoting 4 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 233 (Phillip Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987)). But see Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., The Origins of Article III "Arising Under"
Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE L.J. 263, 270-:73 (2007) (utilizing English law, evidence from the debates
surrounding the framing and ratification of Article II, and the Marshall Court's treatment of
Article III to argue that Article III "arising under" jurisdiction is limited "to cases implicating the
supremacy of actual federal laws").
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improper." 16
The primary statutory means of granting Article IlI power to the
federal courts is 28 U.S.C. § 1331.17 This statute uses language that is
nearly identical to that included in Article III, and its primary effect is to
permit federal courts to resolve federal questions. 18 Commentators
argue that federal question jurisdiction has three purposes: to preserve
"uniformity in federal law, [provide] a forum hospitable to federal law,
and... [provide] a judge likely to have experience in federal law." 19
Despite the parallel language of Article III's "arising under" clause
and 28 U.S.C. § 1331, constitutional federal question jurisdiction is
broader than the statutory federal question jurisdiction. 20 For example,
the so-called "well-pleaded complaint rule generally limits jurisdiction
16. Segall, supra note 14, at 368. There is a reasonable structural argument, however,
against an interpretation of Article III that allows Congress to pass pure jurisdictional
statutes that further its Article I powers. If the "arising under" language reaches that
far, the other categories of jurisdiction listed in Article HI would be unnecessary and
redundant because all of those classes of cases also implicate the national interest and
Congress's Article I powers.... Thus .... a reading of the "arising under" clause that
permits jurisdiction over any case implicating national concerns renders the remainder
of Article 1II superfluous and therefore cannot be correct.
Id. at 369.
17. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
18. John F. Preis, Reassessing the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 247, 250 (2007).
19. Id.; see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 545 U.S. 308,
312 (2005) (noting that a federal forum provides "experience, solicitude, and hope of uniformity"
on federal issues); AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS 164-65 (1969) ("The federal courts have acquired a considerable
expertness in the interpretation and application of federal law which would be lost if federal
question cases were given to the state courts.").
20. Linda S. Mullenix, Complex Litigation Reform and Article III Jurisdiction, 59 FORDHAM
L. REV. 169, 198 (1990); see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 494
(1983) ("Although the language of § 1331 parallels that of the '[a]rising [u]nder' [c]lause of Art.
III, this Court never has held that statutory 'arising under' jurisdiction is identical to Art. III
'arising under' jurisdiction. Quite the contrary is true."); Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 378-79 (1959) (interpreting § 1331's "arising under" language more
restrictively than the parallel constitutional language due to the "demands of reason and
coherence, and the dictates of sound judicial policy which have emerged from [the statute's]
function as a provision in the mosaic of federal judiciary legislation. It is a statute, not a
Constitution, we are expounding."); James E. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, Aggregate
Litigation, and the Limits of Article HI, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1423 n.2 (2007) [hereinafter
Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction] (stating that scholars "conventionally note that the grant of
power in Article III extends more broadly than the general grant of federal question jurisdiction in
§ 1331" and pointing out that the satisfaction of § 1331 requires "the existence of a substantial
federal question on the face of the well-pleaded complaint"); Kenneth C. Randall, Federal
Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73 MINN. L. REV. 349, 367-68 (1988) (noting that
"despite the dictates of legislative history and literalism, 'Art. Ill arising under jurisdiction is
broader than federal question jurisdiction under § 1331"' (quoting Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 495)).
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under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to federal questions raised in the complaint (i.e.,
federal defenses do not give rise to federal jurisdiction under §
1331y, 21
The past two hundred years of constitutional analysis have produced
two related theories of Article III federal question jurisdiction: the
"original ingredient" theory and the protective jurisdiction theory.22
The Supreme Court advanced the "original ingredient" theory-"the
broadest possible construction of arising under jurisdiction" 23-in
Osborn v. Bank of the United States.24 At issue in Osborn was whether
the "arising under" clause of Article III granted Congress authority to
"enact a statute giving the lower federal courts jurisdiction over any
claim brought by or against the Bank of the United States." 25  Chief
Justice Marshall's landmark ruling stated "that if a federal question
'forms an ingredient of the original cause,' then jurisdiction over the
case is properly vested in federal courts."26 In applying the holding in
Osborn the same day it was issued, the Court extended federal
jurisdiction to a state law contract claim brought by the Bank.27  It
reasoned that because Congress created the Bank and allowed it to sue
and to be sued, Article HI's "arising under" requirement was satisfied. 28
Such a minimal amount of federal law included in the complaint
satisfied the demands of the Constitution because, according to the
21. Lumen N. Mulligan, Why Bivens Won't Die: The Legacy of Peoples v. CCA Detention
Centers, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 685, 708 (2006) [hereinafter Mulligan, Why Bivens Won't Die]; see
also Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986) (stating that the well-
pleaded complaint rule is an interpretation of § 1331, not of Article III); Louisville & Nashville
R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (establishing the well-pleaded complaint rule).
Doctrinal orthodoxy states that the [Supreme] Court has established two independent
and irreconcilable tests for determining when a complaint raises a well-pleaded federal
question.... Under [a test advocated for by Justice Holmes], § 1331 jurisdiction arises
if, and only if, the cause of action is created by federal law. Under [a test articulated in
Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 199-202 (1921)], a state cause
of action may arise under § 1331 if an element of the claim necessarily requires the
construction of federal law.
Lumen N. Mulligan, A Unified Theory of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 Jurisdiction, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1667,
1676-77 (2008) [hereinafter Mulligan, Unified Theory].
22. Mullenix, supra note 20, at 198.
23. Id. at 199.
24. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), superseded in part by statute, Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 85,
62 Stat. 934 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006)).
25. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 14, at 547; see also Osborn, 22 U.S. at 825 (discussing
whether "arising under" jurisdiction gives the federal district courts jurisdiction over suits brought
against the Bank of the United States).
26. Mullenix, supra note 20, at 198 (quoting Osborn, 22 U.S. at 823).
27. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 14, at 547 (citing Bank of U.S. v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 904 (1824)).
28. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. at 907.
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Court, the defendant could challenge the Bank's right to sue.29
Furthermore, "[e]ven if the defendant did not actually challenge this
federal element, the potential for such a contest coupled with the need to
determine federal jurisdiction from the face of the complaint justified
treating the claim as one arising under federal law." 30
While it has not expressly overruled Osborn, the Court has narrowed
its interpretation of Article III's "arising under" jurisdiction. 31 For
example, in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,32 the Court
considered whether actions against foreign states brought pursuant to
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)33 were cases "arising
under" federal law for purposes of Article A[.34 Instead of deciding
"the precise boundaries of Article III jurisdiction," the Court held that
such actions arise under federal law because a court must resolve in
each case the federal question of whether the foreign state has
immunity. 35
Subsequently, in Mesa v. California, the Court had to decide whether
claims brought against federal officers acting in their official capacities
arose under Article III, thereby permitting federal courts to have
29. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 14, at 547 (citing Osborn, 22 U.S. at 821-23).
30. Id.
31. Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1207, 1244 n. 152
(2001) (collecting authorities); see also Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136-37 (1989) (arguing
that "grave constitutional problems" would result from grants of "arising-under" jurisdiction in
cases where no "substantive" federal-law question was actually presented and stating that the
Court had not, in the past, "found the need to adopt a theory of 'protective jurisdiction' to support
Art. 1I 'arising under' jurisdiction"); Verfinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 492-
93 (1983) (noting that the "breadth" of Osborn's Article HI definition "has been questioned");
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 471-82 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (contending that Osborn's understanding of Article 1I rested on "premises that ... are
subject to criticism" and generally dismissing various theories of "protective" federal question
jurisdiction stemming from Osborn); Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 965-74 (1982) (critiquing
Osborn as the "notorious" "grandfather of the theory of protective jurisdiction"). But see Am.
Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 505 U.S. 247 (1992) (citing Osborn with approval in ruling that
Congress may confer "arising under" jurisdiction over nonfederal claims involving federally
chartered corporations).
32. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (2006). This statute "regulates the manner in which individuals may
pursue claims against foreign sovereigns." Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at
1433.
34. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 491; see also Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at
1433 (reasoning that for American citizens, there are no jurisdictional problems under the FSIA;
"Article II extends federal jurisdiction on the basis of party alignment to controversies between a
foreign nation and citizens of one of the (United) States. In Verlinden [, however] . . . party-
alignment jurisdiction was unavailable; the plaintiff was a Dutch corporation and the defendant
was a foreign nation.").
35. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 493.
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removal jurisdiction over such claims. 36  There, the Court
acknowledged the "grave constitutional problems" surrounding the
meaning of Article III "arising under" jurisdiction and held that the
"statute. . . authorize[d] removal only when a defendant federal officer
raises an actual federal defense." 37  Thus, the Court again avoided
precisely defining the limits of Article III "arising under" jurisdiction. 38
B. Protective Jurisdiction
Protective jurisdiction-an offshoot of the "original ingredient"
theory-extends Article III federal question jurisdiction to cases or
controversies that do not implicate the construction or interpretation of a
particular federal law. 39 Protective jurisdiction is just a concept-not a
means of obtaining federal jurisdiction; according to Professor Redish,
"[i]t is merely a method of determining the constitutionality under
Article III of congressional attempts to vest jurisdiction in the federal
courts over purely state law matters." 40
Scholars generally recognize three theories of protective
jurisdiction.41 The first, advanced by Professor Wechsler, states that
"Congress should be seen as having the power to provide for federal
36. Bellia, supra note 15, at 267 (citing Mesa, 489 U.S. at 137). In Mesa, two United States
Postal Service mail truck drivers were cited for traffic violations under California state law.
Mesa, 489 U.S. at 123. The cases were subsequently removed to federal court under the federal
officer removal statute, id. at 123-24, which states in part:
A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any of the
following may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the
district and division embracing the place wherein it is pending:
(1) . . . any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of
any agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of
such office or on account of any right, tile or authority claimed under any Act of
Congress for the apprehension or punishment of criminals or the collection of the
revenue.
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2006). The government argued that § 1442(a)(1) should be read to
permit removal without the assertion of a federal defense "based on the plain language of the
removal statute and on the substantial federal interests that would be protected by permitting
universal removal of all civil actions and criminal prosecutions brought against any federal
official 'for the manner in which he has performed his federal duties."' Mesa, 489 U.S. at 134
(citation omitted). The Court disagreed with the government, however, holding that 28 U.S.C. §
1442 could not "independently support" federal jurisdiction. Id. at 136.
37. Bellia, supra note 15, at 267 (citing Mesa, 489 U.S. at 137).
38. See Mesa, 489 U.S. at 137 (finding no need to "adopt a theory of 'protective jurisdiction'
to support [Article] III 'arising under' jurisdiction").
39. Mullenix, supra note 20, at 199 (noting that "protective jurisdiction's crucial feature is its
grant of federal jurisdiction over a case predicated upon state, not federal, substantive law").
40. MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER 90 (2d ed. 1990).
41. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 1428.
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jurisdiction over any state law claim for which Congress could, in the
exercise of its enumerated powers, legislate the rule of decision."42
Consequently, if Congress could regulate contracts of a certain kind
through the commerce power, it would "be 'free to take the lesser step
of drawing suits upon such contracts to the district courts without'
displacing substantive state law."43  As Professors Bickel and
Wellington suggest, it provides "a forum for the enforcement of state
law in a field which Congress could occupy [as] a way of seeking a
degree of uniformity while leaving the maximum room for the exercise
of initiative by the states." 44  Thus, pursuant to Wechsler's theory,
"state law claims would arise under a federal statute that simply
conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts." 45
The second recognized theory of protective jurisdiction, articulated
by Professor Mishkin, would permit Congress to grant federal
jurisdiction over any area that Congress could regulate. Unlike
Wechsler, Mishkin would require that Congress had actually regulated
in that area.46 Mishkin criticizes the notion that "Congress could simply
confer jurisdiction on federal courts to hear claims involving particular
parties who might otherwise face state court bias; he view[s] the heads
of party-alignment jurisdiction in Article III (including diversity
matters) as exhaustively specifying Congress's authority to address such
bias." 47 Indeed, Mishkin's theory of protective jurisdiction attempts to
remedy state courts' "uninformed or hostile attitude" toward
congressional legislative programs (or federal programs).48  Thus,
according to Mishkin, where Congress has set out a federal policy
regulating a particular field, Article ill's "arising under" clause allows
federal courts to have jurisdiction over all of the cases in the field,
42. Id. (quoting Wechsler, supra note 11, at 224-25) (emphasis added).
43. Id. (quoting Wechsler, supra note 11, at 225).
44. Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20 (1957).
45. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 1428.
46. Id.; see also Mullenix, supra note 20, at 199-200.
Professor Wechsler states the broader theory of protective jurisdiction and Professor
Mishkin the narrower. Under either view, [A]rticle In federal question jurisdiction is
analytically tied to [A]rticle I legislative power. The broader view posits that
protective jurisdiction is supportable inferentially where Congress could have
legislated some substantive interest under [A]rticle I, but has not done so. The
narrower theory posits that, for protective jurisdiction to be applicable, Congress must
have manifested a federal interest actively through legislation. (citations omitted).
Id.
47. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 1428-29 (citing Mishkin, supra note
1l, at 192).
48. Mishkin, supra note 11, at 195.
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including cases that would be controlled by state law. 49
Professor Goldberg-Ambrose offers a third theory of protective
jurisdiction. 50  To begin, Goldberg-Ambrose views Osborn not as an
example of protective jurisdiction but "as an instance of conventional
federal ingredient jurisdiction." 51  She also criticizes Wechsler's so-
called "greater power" theory52 and Mishkin's "partial occupation"
theory.53  In doing so, Goldberg-Ambrose argues that "Congress does
not always have the greater power to regulate the particulars of a field
of commerce; moreover, there may be too much state-to-state variation
and too little agreement in Congress to set forth a detailed federal
code."54  Rather, she suggests that in such circumstances,
"incorporation of state law may provide the only practical means by
which Congress can regulate," and that "protective jurisdiction might
reflect a congressional desire to secure procedural harmonization or
simplification through a shift of litigation to the federal system." 55
Goldberg-Ambrose's theory of protective jurisdiction would thus
temper the broad federal power to extend protective jurisdiction with
the understanding that state sovereignty may outweigh federal
concerns.
56
The legitimacy of protective jurisdiction-both generally and as a
basis for the expansion of Article III federal question jurisdiction-is
49. Id. at 192. Mishkin also notably distinguishes his approach from Wechsler's by arguing
that even under the current expansive conception of the commerce power, though "it seems fairly
clear that Congress might legislate as to most legal relations of an entity created and organized as
the Bank [in Osborn] was, it is far from certain ... that federal law could be made substantively
to govern every one of the Bank's lawsuits." Id. at 189.
50. Goldberg-Ambrose defines protective jurisdiction as applying to claims within federal
jurisdiction that rest entirely on state law (and that do not qualify for diversity jurisdiction). See
Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 14, at 546-50 (defining her theory of protective jurisdiction).
51. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 1429; see also Goldberg-Ambrose,
supra note 14, at 547-48 (rejecting Professor Mishkin's characterization of Osborn as an instance
of protective jurisdiction).
52. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 14, at 589-91. Justice Frankfurter so named Wechsler's
theory while rejecting it in Lincoln Mills, stating that the restrictions of Article HI were not "met
or respected by a beguiling phrase that the greater includes the lesser." Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 474 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
53. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 14, at 592-95.
54. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 1429 (citing Goldberg-Ambrose, supra
note 14, at 576-83, 593). With this criticism, Goldberg-Ambrose echoes Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in Lincoln Mills. See infra notes 61-67 and accompanying text (offering a more complete
discussion of this case).
55. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 1429-30; see also Goldberg-Ambrose,
supra note 14, at 577-78 (discussing the efficiencies of federal adoption of "ready-made" state
law).
56. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 1430; see also Goldberg-Ambrose,
supra note 14, at 546, 594 (discussing the importance of state autonomy).
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uncertain, as the Supreme Court has not definitively approved the
application of any protective jurisdiction theory. 57 Early on, in National
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,58 Justices Jackson,
Burton, and Black implicitly endorsed protective jurisdiction in a
plurality opinion.59 While considering the constitutionality of a statute
giving federal district courts jurisdiction of civil actions between
citizens of states and citizens of the District of Columbia, the plurality
noted that
[u]nless we are to deny to Congress the same choice of means through
which to govern the District of Columbia that we have held it to have
in exercising other legislative powers enumerated in the same Article,
we cannot hold that Congress lacked the power it sought to exercise in
the Act before us.60
After Tidewater, however, the Court has consistently side-stepped the
issue of the legitimacy and applicability of protective jurisdiction. In
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 61 the Court considered the
power of Congress to provide for the enforcement of labor contracts,
specifically section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA), which confers jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear "suits
for violation" of a contract between an employer and a labor
organization. 62  Although section 301 apparently resulted from
Congress's desire to ensure that federal courts would be able to enforce
collective bargaining agreements, particularly in lawsuits against
unions, the legitimacy of the jurisdictional grant was questionable.63
Many commentators believed that, with this statute, Congress neglected
to articulate any substantive body of labor contract law; instead, it
"simply conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts in the expectation
57. See Mullenix, supra note 20, at 199 (maintaining that the protective jurisdiction theory is
just a theory, not a means of attaining jurisdiction).
58. 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
59. Id. at 588-604.
60. Id. at 591. The plurality also argued that "[i]t is too late to hold that judicial functions
incidental to Art. I powers of Congress cannot be conferred on courts existing under Art. III for it
has been done with this Court's approval." Id. at 591-92. Ultimately, the Court upheld the
statute (and the grant of federal jurisdiction) at issue. Id. at 604, 655. The six other justices
rejected the theory of protective jurisdiction advanced by the plurality, however. Goldberg-
Ambrose, supra note 14, at 559.
61. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
62. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (2006). For an account of the passage of the labor contract provisions of
the LMRA, see James E. Pfander, Judicial Purpose and the Scholarly Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 243 (1991).
63. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 1430 (noting that "doubts arose about
the source of governing law and the legitimacy of the resulting jurisdictional grant").
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 41
that state rules of contract law would apply."64
Although all three theories of protective jurisdiction would uphold
the grant of jurisdiction under section 301,65 the Court did not examine
the applicability of protective jurisdiction in Lincoln Mills. Instead, it
decided that section 301 created a federal substantive right to the
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements, thereby requiring the
federal courts to define the contours of that substantive right as a matter
of federal common law. 66 Pursuant to this understanding of section
301, "suits for violation of the collective agreement arose under federal
law and presented no protective jurisdictional issues." 67
The Court has avoided relying on any theory of protective
jurisdiction since Lincoln Mills.6 8  For instance, it eschewed this
opportunity in both Verlinden and Mesa.69 In Verlinden, where federal
jurisdiction depended on a finding that the claims at issue (brought
under the FSIA for anticipatory repudiation of a letter of credit) arose
under federal law, 70  the Court expressly declined to consider the
argument that the FSIA "is constitutional as an aspect of so-called
'protective jurisdiction.' 71 The Court concluded "that proper actions
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 457 (adding that any state law applied would not be an
independent basis for private rights, but would instead be absorbed as federal law).
67. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 1431-32. Justice Frankfurter, however,
thought that section 301 should be viewed as a grant of jurisdiction that would require the federal
courts to apply state law. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 469-70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He thus
had to address the constitutionality of section 301 and the arguments for protective jurisdiction
that had been advanced in support of the statute. Id. Writing only for himself, Frankfurter
concluded that section 301 exceeded the bounds of article 111. Id. at 484.
Frankfurter cast doubt on the ingredient theory-articulated in Osborn-and found no
substantial federal ingredient in a section 301 claim. Id. at 470-72. He then reviewed and
criticized Wechsler's "greater power" and Mishkin's "partial occupation" theories of protective
jurisdiction; with respect to Wechsler's theory, Frankfurter argued that claims cannot arise under
a jurisdictional statute, even one adopted within an area of commerce over which Congress could
exercise substantive control, because such a theory could "vastly extend" the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to include "every contract and tort arising out of a contract affecting commerce...
even though only state law was involved in the decision of the case" and would rest on a belief
that state courts were inadequate in interpreting state law. Id. at 474-75.
Furthermore, Frankfurter indicated that although Mishkin's approach would apply only to
claims within a field that Congress had previously regulated, it would still transfer state law
claims to federal court and expand federal power. Id. at 476-77. Frankfurter would apparently
permit Congress to shift state law matters into federal courts pursuant to party-alignment grants of
jurisdiction. Id. at 476.
68. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 1433.
69. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (introducing and briefly describing the
Verlinden and Mesa cases).
70. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480,483 (1983).
71. Id. at 492 n.17.
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by foreign plaintiffs under the [FSIA] are within Article III 'arising
under' jurisdiction .... 72
Similarly, in Mesa73-the Supreme Court's most recent confrontation
with the concept of protective jurisdiction-the Court, relying on
Verlinden, held that 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)
is a pure jurisdictional statute, seeking to do nothing more than grant
district court jurisdiction over cases in which a federal officer is a
defendant. Section 1442(a), therefore, cannot independently support
Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction. Rather, it is the raising of a
federal question in the officer's removal petition that constitutes the
federal law under which the action against the federal officer arises for
Art. III purposes. 74
The Court rejected the government's contention that the raising of a
federal defense was not necessary under § 1442 by noting that
"[a]dopting the [g]overnment's view would eliminate the substantive
Art. III foundation of § 1442(a)(1) and unnecessarily present grave
constitutional problems." 75 It was unwilling to remedy these problems
by applying a theory of protective jurisdiction, 76 however, stating that it
72. Id. To reach this conclusion, the Court emphasized the substantive (as opposed to the
jurisdictional) content of federal law, stating that the FSIA
does not merely concern access to the federal courts. Rather, it governs the types of
actions for which foreign sovereigns may be held liable in a court in the United States,
federal or state. The [FSIA] codifies the standards governing foreign sovereign
immunity as an aspect of substantive federal law, and applying those standards will
generally require interpretation of numerous points of federal law.
Id. at 496-97 (citations omitted).
The Court also acknowledged the Osborn decision as controlling on the scope of Article III
"arising under" jurisdiction, but concluded that it did not need to
decide the precise boundaries of Article IH jurisdiction, . . . since the present case does
not involve a mere speculative possibility that a federal question may arise at some
point in the proceeding. Rather, a suit against a foreign state under [the FSIA]
necessarily raises questions of substantive federal law at the very outset, and hence
clearly 'arises under"' federal law, as that term is used in Article m.
Id. at 493. With the FSIA, the Court reasoned, Congress exercised "its authority over foreign
commerce and foreign relations ... to decide, as a matter of federal law, whether and under what
circumstances foreign nations should be amenable to suit in the United States." Id. As the FSIA
must be applied by the District Courts in every action against a foreign sovereign, since
subject matter jurisdiction in any such action depends on the existence of one of the
specified exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity .... an action against a foreign
sovereign arises under federal law, for purposes of Article III jurisdiction."
Id. at 493-94.
73. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989).
74. Id. (construing Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 491).
75. Id. at 137.
76. Id. In support of the application of protective jurisdiction, the government argued that the
full protection of federal officers from interference by hostile state courts cannot be
achieved if the averment of a federal defense must be a predicate to removal. More
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had not previously posited "'protective jurisdiction' [theories] to
support Art. III 'arising under' jurisdiction, and [that it did] not see any
need for doing so here because [it did] not recognize any federal
interests that are not protected by limiting removal to situations in
which a federal defense is alleged." 77
The Supreme Court has not addressed protective jurisdiction since
Mesa. Scholars have argued, however, that "the trajectory of [the
Court's] federalism rulings since Mesa give little reason to suppose it
has developed a more spacious view of the scope of [']arising-under
jurisdiction.['] ' ' 78  The Court has recently limited Congress's power to
regulate matters affecting interstate commerce and its power to
important, the [g]overnment suggest[ed] that this generalized congressional interest in
protecting federal officers from state court interference suffice[d] to support Art. I
"arising under" jurisdiction.
Id.
77. Id. The Court clarified that in the prosecutions removed in Mesa, "no state court hostility
or interference ha[d] even been alleged by petitioners and [the Court could] discern no federal
interest in potentially forcing local district attorneys to choose between prosecuting traffic
violations hundreds of miles from the municipality in which the violations occurred or
abandoning those prosecutions." Mesa, 489 U.S. at 137-38.
78. Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 1435; see also Mullenix, supra note 20,
at 200 ("Although the theory of protective jurisdiction has proved perennially popular among
academic theorists, its expositors have made little advance on... the theory. Moreover, since the
Supreme Court has consistently avoided declaring a definitive position on protective jurisdiction
[in cases such as Verlinden and Mesa], the doctrine's legitimacy as a basis for expanding article
III federal question jurisdiction is uncertain."); Georgene Vairo, Judicial v. Congressional
Federalism: The Implications of the New Federalism Decisions on Mass Tort Cases and Other
Complex Litigation, 33 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1559, 1617 (2000) (acknowledging that "the Supreme
Court has never embraced the [protective jurisdiction] doctrine").
Several lessons can be gleaned from the Supreme Court's treatment of cases potentially
implicating protective jurisdiction. First, "Congress cannot simply transfer state law claims to the
federal courts because it has protected an area of federal concern by empowering the federal
courts to apply state law. Cases do not arise under jurisdictional statutes for purposes of
satisfying Article Il." Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 1436.
[In order to permit] the federal courts to exercise federal question jurisdiction,
Congress must establish federal substantive rights on which the success of the claims
in some sense must depend. Congress may declare the content of federal substantive
law itself, of course, or, as in the majority's account of labor contract enforcement
under section 301, direct the federal courts to do so. The Court's willingness to
fashion federal common law at Congress's behest may depend in part on the degree of
guidance Congress has provided.
Id.
[Although federal] entities like the Bank, created by an act of Congress, may bring suit
in federal court, even to enforce state law rights of action, because their very existence
depends on federal law[, ... a simple declaration that, within a certain area of federal
concern, federal courts should hear state law claims or that federal law incorporates
state law without altering its content, neither warrants the creation of federal common
law nor establishes any rules of federal substance under which claims may arise.
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implement its regulatory initiatives through the agency of the states.
79
Furthermore, it narrowly construed Congress's power to permit
individuals to sue states to enforce federal regulatory schemes. 80 These
recent rulings have attempted to identify the limits of congressional
power, which concerned both Justice Frankfurter and the Verlinden and
Mesa Courts. 81
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EDGE ACT AND SECTION 63282
This Part introduces various aspects of the Edge Act that will
ultimately aid in evaluating its constitutionality. Part ILI.A describes the
Act's historical context, Part II.B discusses the modem interpretations
(broad and narrow) of the Act, and Part ILI.C summarizes the recent
case law that has further broadened the reach of Edge Act jurisdiction.
Finally, Part III.D outlines a statutory-level approach to interpreting and
applying the Edge Act that addresses the many problems associated
with the current broad, unstructured, and inconsistent understanding and
application of the provisions of section 632 by the federal courts.
79. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (concluding that a federal statute
creating a private right of action for gender-based violence was unconstitutional because it
exceeded the scope of the congressional power over commerce); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549 (1995) (invalidating a federal law that criminalized drug possession because it exceeded
Congress's power to regulate commerce); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
(finding to be unconstitutional federal laws directed at securing state administrative enforcement
of federal statutes); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (invalidating a federal
statute that commandeered state legislatures into adopting a state law that incorporated federal
standards); STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC
CONSTITUTION 59-60 (2005) (discussing recent decisions that "limit the federal government's
ability to control the activities of individuals and businesses."). Cf Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1
(2005) (upholding Congress's ability to criminalize private cultivation and use of marijuana for
medicinal purposes).
80. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that a federal statute adopted under the
Commerce Clause was unconstitutional to the extent that it authorized individuals to sue a state
for damages in state court); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (concluding that the
Eleventh Amendment bars Congress from authorizing individuals to sue states in federal court to
enforce a federal commerce statute); cf Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006)
(holding that the constitutional grant of plenary power enables Congress to subject states to suit in
bankruptcy proceedings); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (upholding Congress's power
to abrogate state sovereign immunity through legislation enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment); BREYER, supra note 79, at 60-61 (discussing the Court's limitations on Congress's
Commerce Clause power through restrictions on Congress's ability to abrogate the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity).
81. See Pfander, Protective Jurisdiction, supra note 20, at 1435-36.
82. Portions of Part Ell are derived from Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The "Technicalities" of Edge Act
Jurisdiction: Advocating for the Federal Courts' Adoption of and Adherence to a Uniform and
Narrow Interpretation of 12 U.S.C. § 632, 41 U. TOE. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1461823.
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A. Historical Context of the Edge Act
The Edge Act was enacted after the first World War "to encourage
the flow of private capital (as opposed to direct[ing] U.S. government
outlays) to help rebuild war[-]torn Europe." 83 It was also a response to
the tension between American trade and fiscal policies after World War
I: as "Americans saw it, the problem was to keep responsibility for the
war-debt payments in Europe [while giving] the Europeans enough
financial breathing space to reconstruct their economy, restore the trade
network, and earn enough dollars to pay their debts and buy American
exports." 84
Sponsored by Senator Walter Edge, 85 the bill that eventually became
the Edge Act necessitated a number of modifications to the U.S.
economy. Specifically, it required the formation of federally
incorporated and regulated investment trusts that took "foreign
securities in payment for exports and reimburse[d] the exporters with
funds gathered through the public sale of debentures which [were]
backed by foreign securities."86 This export trust plan permitted experts
83. Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. & James H. Freis, Jr., Fostering Competition in Financial Services:
From Domestic Supervision to Global Standards, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 57, 65-66 (1999); see
also WILLIAM F. NoTz & RICHARD S. HARVEY, AMERICAN FOREIGN TRADE: As PROMOTED BY
THE WEBB-POMERENE AND EDGE ACTS 11 (1921) (noting that the Edge Act was passed to
promote the export trade of the United States).
[T]he United States undertook a number of initiatives in 1918 and 1919 to encourage
investment abroad. Perhaps the most noteworthy initiative, in addition to the foreign
tax credit, was the Edge Act, passed by Congress in late 1919, which promoted the
development of federally-chartered banking enterprises designed to channel private
domestic capital to European reconstruction.
Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. International Taxation,
46 DuKEL.J. 1021, 1053 (1997).
84. Paul P. Abrahams, American Bankers and the Economic Tactics of Peace: 1919, 56 J. AM.
HIST. 572, 575 (1969).
85. See Walter E. Edge Papers, 1782-1968 (bulk 1905-1956), http://diglib.princeton.edu/
ead/getEadeadid=MC042&kw=#bioghist (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) for a biography of Senator
Edge-a New Jersey businessman and politician.
86. Abrahams, supra note 84, at 577-78. "The planners counted on the War Finance
Corporation to supplement the flow of private capital to these risk-taking export banks by
subscribing up to 20 percent of their debentures." Id. at 578; see also Franklin D. Jones,
Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 YALE L.J. 351, 361 (1927).
In April, 1918, the War Finance Corporation was created with a capital of one-half
billion dollars. This corporation was not only given the power to make advances to
enterprises aiding in the prosecution of the War, but a Capital Issues Committee was
established which had a large control over the use of the capital of the nation through
its power to prevent or prohibit (with certain exceptions) the sale or subscription to any
issue of securities in excess of $100,000."). This plan "was expected to have a 'good
moral effect' and to attract private investment by showing that the government of the
United States had confidence in the banks.
Abrahams, supra note 84, at 578.
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to make the investment decisions while raising the needed capital by
having the United States back the trusts both morally and financially. 87
Section 632 was incorporated into the Edge Act during the Great
Depression as part of a remedial banking legislation scheme. Congress
passed the Act to remedy the problems and abuses within the banking
system, many of which manifested themselves in 1929.88 This section
was part of the amendments to the Federal Reserve Act 89 proposed by
Senator Carter Glass and Representative Henry Steagall, commonly
known as the Glass-Steagall Act.90 It was "thus considered a part of a
comprehensive package of reforms of the national banking system." 91
87. Id. (citations omitted). Senator Edge told the Senate: "'Every step in the transaction
would be under the supervision of the United States through the Federal Reserve Board... such
investments would be thoroughly safeguarded."' Id. (citations omitted). Further, Senator Robert
Owen of the Senate Banking Committee warned that if the Edge Act was not passed, America
would "'meet with an obstruction to [its] foreign commerce that [would bring] the most injurious
consequences upon the people of the United States, upon the home markets, and upon all sorts of
stocks and securities."' Id. (citations omitted).
88. Robert M. Brill & James J. Bjorkman, Federal Court Jurisdiction Over International
Banking Transactions, 110 BANKING L.J. 118, 119 (1993) (citing S. REP. No. 77, 73rd Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (May 15, 1933)).
89. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 was designed to "provide for the establishment of
Federal reserve banks, to furnish an elastic currency, to afford means of rediscounting
commercial paper, to establish a more effective supervision of banking in the United States, and
for other purposes." Pub. L. No. 73-33, 38 Stat. 251, 251 (1913). See also Abrahams, supra note
84, at 572 ("The [Federal Reserve Act of 1913] provided the United States with the machinery for
international banking."). Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz contended that the wave of bank
failures, which began in late 1930, occurred because the Federal Reserve System failed in its
responsibility under the Federal Reserve Act to maintain the banking system's liquidity. MILTON
FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES:
1867-1960, at 299-419 (1963).
90. FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 89, at 299-419. "Section 632 was enacted as
[s]ection 15 of the Banking Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 184, to amend [slection 25 of the Federal
Reserve Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 273." Id. (citations omitted). Congress enacted the Glass-Steagall
Act during the Great Depression to separate commercial and investment banking and to establish
deposit insurance to protect Americans' savings. John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who
Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why?-The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K.
Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727, 1752 (2007); John K. Forst, Comment, Legislative
Reform of Glass-Steagall: Bank Sponsorship and Distribution of Mutual Funds is Long Overdue,
19 CAP. U. L. REv. 521, 527 (1990) (noting that "[w]hile the Glass-Steagall Act had far-reaching
consequences vis-A-vis banks' securities activities, it did not affect the exercise of fiduciary
powers allowed banks two decades earlier under the Federal Reserve Act.").
The purpose of the Glass-Steagall Act is evidenced by a quote by Senator Glass stating
that '[t]he purpose of the regulatory provisions of this bill is to call back to the service
of agriculture and commerce and industry the bank credit and the bank service
designed by the framers of the Federal Reserve Act.'
Mark E. Nance & Bemd Singhof, Banking's Influence Over Non-Bank Companies After Glass-
Steagall: A German Universal Comparison, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1305, 1334 (2000) (citing
Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617,632 n.29 (1971)).
91. Brill & Bjorkman, supra note 88, at 119 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 150, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 2
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In light of the abovementioned historical background, Congress has
explicitly stated that the purpose of the Edge Act was to:
provide for the establishment of international banking and financial
corporations operating under Federal supervision with powers
sufficiently broad to enable them to compete effectively with similar
foreign-owned institutions in the United States and abroad; to afford
to the United States exporter and importer in particular... at all times
a means of financing international trade, especially United States
exports; to foster the participation by regional and smaller banks
throughout the United States in the provision of international banking
and financing services ... ; to stimulate competition in the provision
of international banking and financial services throughout the United
States; and, . . . to facilitate and stimulate the export of United States
goods ... and ... to achieve a sound United States international trade
position. 92
The Congressional purpose of the Edge Act paralleled its purpose as
it was described by Senator Edge on the floor of the Senate in 1919:
When an American producer or manufacturer sells a bill of goods
abroad under present conditions, . . . the credit demanded is practically
impossible, so far as the individual producer or manufacturer is
concerned. That situation will be relieved through the incorporation
of these banks.... These banks will then be in a position to take the
securities offered to the American manufacturer or producer, so that
the [sic] can turn the securities into the bank under regular ordinary
banking conditions and form. On those securities he receives the
amount of the bills that would otherwise be paid him abroad if credit
conditions were anything like normal. The bank in turn, .. . will hold
the securities of various kinds. . . under supervision of the Federal
Reserve Board . . . to issue bonds or debentures to the American
public. . . . Our banks at the present time are not in a position to
finance foreign sales, and it is necessary ... that we supplement the
banking system in this carefully protected manner.93
On the other hand, section 632 had no defined purpose. 94 In fact,
Senator Glass, in his remarks on the floor of the Senate, stated that he
was "not so familiar with the technicalities of [section 632]," ' and
noted that he was "rather inclined to object to [this section], having
(May 15, 1933)).
92. 12 U.S.C. § 611(a) (1994).
93. Davidoff, supra note 6, at 688 n.4 (citations omitted).
94. See id. at 689 ("Despite the wealth of legislative history on the Glass-Steagall Act in
general, relatively little legislative history is available on [s]ection 632 itself. The available
legislative history does suggest an absence of any definitive congressional intent concerning this
section.").
95. 75 CONG. REC. 9889 (1932).
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gotten some faint idea that when lawyers in this or any other body begin
a discussion of jurisdictional matters they consume a great deal of time,
and [he] wanted to get the bill through."' 96 Ultimately, Glass concluded
that "the Senators who are lawyers can determine whether or not that
provision of the bill shall remain in it."97  Commentators have
suggested that without evidence of clear congressional intent, section
632's purpose can be gleaned from the objectives of the Edge and
Glass-Steagall Acts: "to establish and strengthen a national banking
system and provide a comprehensive national regulatory apparatus."
98
Decisions by several federal courts have supported this notion.
99
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Davidoff, supra note 6, at 689.
Inferentially, then, the role of [s]ection 632 is to permit the establishment of a uniform
body of law for national banks and provide a federal forum for disputes in which
national banks are involved in international or foreign transactions, thereby lending an
added measure of certainty, reliability and enhanced scrutiny to the banks' interactions
with their customers throughout the world.
Id. at 690.
99. See Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220 F.3d 1235, 1241-42 (1 lth Cir. 2000)
(citing People ex rel. Cosentino v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., 579 F. Supp. 1261, 1264-65 n.2
(N.D. 11. 1984)) (stating that section 632 was enacted to (1) prevent "inconsistent state court
interpretations of the Federal Reserve Act and accompanying regulations"; (2) recognize "that
federal reserve banks were deemed citizens of no state and thus could not remove cases against
them to federal court on diversity grounds"; and (3) recognize that "the extension of federal
jurisdiction over federal reserve banks was based on [an understanding] of the central role the
federal reserve banks played in the nation's economy and their actions as fiscal agents and sub-
treasuries for the federal government."); A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Int'l Banking Corp., 62
F.3d 1454, 1462 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (suggesting that "one can divine the likely reasons for the grant
of federal jurisdiction [set forth in section 632]," explaining that as it was "[c]rafted in the wake
of the turmoil that the World War had caused in international financial markets, the Edge Act
called forth a new type of federally controlled institution intended to increase the stability of, and
the public's confidence in, international markets," and inferring that section 632 was "intended to
facilitate and stimulate international trade by providing the uniformity of federal law").
In A.I. Trade Finance, the D.C. Circuit also posited that section 632 was intended to remedy the
"unavailability of diversity jurisdiction under the rule of Bankers' Trust." Id. at 1463. In
Bankers' Trust Co. v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co., 241 U.S. 295, 309-10 (1916), the Supreme
Court held that a corporation chartered pursuant to an act of Congress is not a citizen of any state
for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction. See also Dudley 0. McGovney, A Supreme Court
Fiction: Corporations in the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 56 HARV. L.
REv. 853, 861 (1943) ("Over and over again, early and late, the Supreme Court has held that a
corporation is not a 'citizen' as that term is used in the Constitution."). "In 1958, however,
[]Congress specifically sought to restrict []diversity jurisdiction by providing that a corporation
shall be 'deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and of the State
where it has its principal place of business."' A.I. Trade Fin., Inc., 62 F.3d at 1458 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)). Thus, Congress combated "'the evil whereby a local institution, engaged in
a local business and[,] in many cases[,] locally owned, is enabled to bring its litigation into the
[flederal courts simply because it has obtained a corporate charter from another State."' Id.
(citing H.R. REP. No. 1706, at 4 (1958)).
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B. Modem Interpretations of Section 632 of the Edge Act
In relevant part, the Edge Act states that federal courts have original
jurisdiction over:
all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity to which any
corporation organized under the laws of the United States shall be a
party, arising out of transactions involving international or foreign
banking or banking in a dependency or insular possession of the
United States, or out of other international or foreign financial
operations, either directly or through the agency, ownership, or control
of branches or local institutions in dependencies or insular possessions
of the United States or in foreign countries .... 100
Some federal courts have broadly interpreted the Act, indicating that
any potential connection to an international or foreign banking
transaction is enough for Edge Act jurisdiction; such a transaction need
not be central to the lawsuit in question. Other federal courts, however,
have narrowly interpreted the Act, holding that "[s]ection 632
jurisdiction must be founded upon a case centered [on] a 'traditional
banking transaction' or 'banking law issues."' 10 1 Thus, there exists a
clear disagreement (if not a traditional circuit split) among the federal
courts regarding the true meaning and the proper application of the Act.
1. The Broad Interpretation of Section 632 of the Edge Act
The broad interpretation of the Edge Act arises primarily from two
federal circuit court decisions that have attached an expansive meaning
to the phrase "involving international or foreign banking."' 10 2 Indeed,
these decisions have found that Edge Act jurisdiction extends to cases
that "bear some connection, even if tangential, to an international or
foreign banking transaction .... In other words, the suit does not have
to focus [or center] on banking issues, but must simply arise from a
banking transaction."' 10 3
In Conjugal Society Composed of Juvenal Rosa v. Chicago Title
Insurance Co. ("Juvenal Rosa"),1° 4 the United States Court of Appeals
100. 12 U.S.C. § 632 (1991). Stated another way, "[t]o establish jurisdiction under the Edge
Act, (1) the suit must be civil in nature; (2) one of the parties in interest must be a corporation
organized under the laws of the United States; and (3) the suit must arise out of a transaction
involving international or foreign banking." Sollitt v. KeyCorp, No. i:09-CV-43, 2009 WL
367494, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2009) (citing In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig.,
No. 1409, 21-95, 2003 WL 22097502, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2003)).
101. Davidoff, supra note 6, at 693 (citations omitted).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 691.
104. Conjugal Soc'y Composed of Juvenal Rosa v. Chi. Title Ins. Co. (Juvenal Rosa), 690
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982).
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for the First Circuit broadly construed the Edge Act and held that the
plaintiffs had set out sufficient facts to invoke section 632 jurisdiction
because the "plaintiffs' rights [were] alleged to have arisen out of [the]
defendants' mortgage agreements and thus out of a transaction
involving banking within the meaning of section 632." 105 The First
Circuit reached this decision despite the fact that the defendants argued
that "section 632 jurisdiction is absent because the gist of [the
plaintiffs'] claim is negligence and conspiracy[,] which by themselves
bear no relationship to banking."' 10 6  The Juvenal Rosa court reasoned
that "[s]ection 632 reaches only traditional banking activities, not all
cases in which a bank organized under federal law is a party."' 10 7
The broad interpretation of the Edge Act also arose in Corporacifn
Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp. ("CVF').'018 In CVF, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that
the application of "[s]ection 632 is not limited to the original two parties
to a banking transaction."'10 9 It found that the case before it involved
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id. The First Circuit thus "found the action to have arisen out of transactions involving
banking within the meaning of section 632 even though the core of the plaintiffs' claims
consisted of allegations of fraud and negligence." Davidoff, supra note 6, at 693.
107. Juvenal Rosa, 690 F.2d at 4 (citing Diaz v. Pan Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 635 F.2d
30, 32 (1st Cir. 1980)). These traditional banking activities, according to the First Circuit,
"include mortgage agreements[] and foreclosures on mortgages." Id.
Subsequently, the First Circuit added a number of other "traditional banking activities" to this
list, including "loan guarantor agreements, subordination agreements, and suits to recover on
defaulted loans," Burgos v. Citibank N.A., 432 F.3d 46, 49 (1st Cir. 2005), "though these
activities must contain some foreign aspect to qualify for Edge Act jurisdiction." Sollitt v.
KeyCorp, No. 1:09-CV-43, 2009 WL 367494, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2009). Other courts
have also deemed currency conversion and the imposition of foreign currency conversion fees to
be traditional banking functions. See Clarken v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc., No. 01-C-5123, 2001
WL 1263366, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2001); see also Highland Crusader Offshore Partners, L.P.
v. LifeCare Holdings, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 2d 730, 735-37 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (citations omitted)
(containing a comprehensive list of traditional banking activities).
108. Corp. Venezolana de Fomento v. Vintero Sales Corp. (CVF), 629 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
109. Juvenal Rosa, 690 F.2d at 4. Previously, the United States District Court for the District
of Puerto Rico held that section 632 jurisdiction extended to a claim by one cosigner of a letter of
guaranty against another cosigner contesting the validity of the letter, when a bank that was
organized under the laws of the United States relied on the letter in granting a loan. See Nat'l
City Bank of N.Y. v. Puig, 106 F. Supp. 1, 2-3 (D.P.R. 1952). Although summary judgment had
been granted in favor of Plaintiff National City Bank, the court held that it had jurisdiction to
decide the claim between the two cosigners-the third-party plaintiff and defendant, respectively,
who were both domiciled in Puerto Rico-under the Edge Act because
National City Bank... is a corporation organized under the laws of the United States,.
• . this litigation was initiated by said corporation. . . . this action arose from a
transaction involving banking in Puerto Rico . . . . the validity and nature of said
banking transaction, as well as the determination as to who are the parties bound
thereby[,] ... is the principal and only issue of the third-party proceedings.... [and]
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international or foreign banking for the purposes of Edge Act
jurisdiction "based on the role of SPIB, a nationally chartered bank that
was an original defendant, but which had settled by the time of the
appeal."" 10 Ultimately, the CVF court upheld federal jurisdiction under
section 632
even though (1) the federally chartered bank that provided the
predicate for jurisdiction was no longer a defendant in the action; (2)
the banking transaction on which [s]ection 632 jurisdiction was
premised ...took place entirely in the United States; and (3) the
lawsuit focused on the actions of defendants other than the federally
chartered bank.1 1
2. The Narrow Interpretation of Section 632 of the Edge Act
Several federal district courts have rejected the broad approach to
section 632 jurisdiction. Instead, they have concluded that section 632
jurisdiction extends only to cases that center upon "traditional banking
transactions" or "banking law issues."' 112
In Telecredit Service Center v. First National Bank of the Florida
Keys,113 for example, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Florida held that the Edge Act "encompass[es] only those
transactions characterized as traditional banking activities, such as
transactions involving mortgage foreclosures, letters of credit, letters of
[P]laintiff National City Bank.. . as creditor on said contested banking transaction has
a substantial interest in said issue.
Id. at 3. The court rejected the third-party defendant's allegations that the claim regarding the
transaction in question
had been finally disposed of by the [entry of] summary judgment ...and that ...
jurisdiction has ... ceased to exist with respect to the issues raised in the third-party
proceedings, because both the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant.., are
citizens of and domiciled in Puerto Rico, and even if said proceedings were considered
ancillary to the main litigation, the same have ceased to be ancillary . .. [after]
summary judgment was entered, and should thereafter be classed as an independent
action between two residents to be litigated in the local courts.
Id.
110. Thomas J. McCormack, et al., Edge Act Enables National Banks to Invoke Federal
Jurisdiction Over Suits Involving International Banking or Financial Operations, 124 BANKING
L.J. 907, 911 (2007). The Second Circuit indicated that SPIB had provided a letter of credit for
the benefit of Defendant Vintero and allegedly wrongfully allowed Vintero to draw against the
letter of credit. See CVF, 629 F.2d at 792. Because "CVF's complaint clearly viewed SPIB as
potentially liable for damages[,] SPIB is a federally chartered bank, and the transaction
[involving] Vintero, in New York, dr[awing] on a letter of credit on the account of a Venezuelan
corporation, Cariven, [the Second Circuit determined that the transaction] was one involving
'international or foreign banking."' Id.
111. Davidoff, supra note 6, at 692-93.
112. Id.
113. 679 F. Supp. 1101 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
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guaranty when the bank relied on the letter in granting a loan, and
transactions involving Federal Reserve Banks." 114 The Telecredit court
stated that in analyzing the existence of section 632 jurisdiction, "[t]he
focus of the court's inquiry must be whether 'the transaction in question
be one arising out of... international or foreign banking." '
115
The court in Telecredit used this approach to determine whether
section 632 jurisdiction extended to a dispute between Telecredit
Service Center ("Telecredit"), which processed credit card charges for
sales of travel club memberships that a large number of purported
buyers later refused to pay, and First National Bank of the Florida Keys
("First National"), which accepted for deposit credit card invoices from
the sellers of the travel club memberships. 116  "There was an
exceptionally high percentage of 'chargebacks,' 117 on the ... submitted
sales drafts, totaling more than $639,000 ... ."I 18 As a result, Telecredit
brought a lawsuit against First National for fraud and
misrepresentation.' l 9 In its counterclaim, First National alleged that
Telecredit wrongfully demanded that it pay for the chargebacks.1 20 It
then removed the action to federal court, arguing that federal question
jurisdiction existed under section 632.121
The Telecredit court found that the transaction was not a traditional
banking transaction under 12 U.S.C. § 632. Instead, the court
determined that the true nature of the transaction at issue, "the
allocation of risk with respect to fraudulent chargebacks," was
contractual 122 and did not merit Edge Act jurisdiction.123
114. Id. at 1103 (citations omitted).
115. Id. (citing CVF, 629 F.2d at 791-92 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 632)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
116. Id. at 1102-04.
117. "Chargebacks are those charges that the card holder's issuing bank declines to pay at the
insistence of the card holder, who claims that the charges were not of her doing." Id. at 1102.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1102-03. Specifically, arguing in support of section 632 jurisdiction, First
National alleged that "the supposed fraud involved the sale of travel club memberships in Elbow
Cay Club of Abaco, Bahamas, a foreign jurisdiction." Id. at 1103. Further, First National noted
that the sale of the travel club memberships implicated
Visa and Master Card transactions involv[ing] billions of dollars throughout this nation
and abroad. . . . [These transactions are subject to a variety of internal (Visa and
Mastercard) and federal regulations and.... th[e] court's resolution of the chargeback
issue is one of first impression [and is] likely to have national and international
significance.
Id. Thus, First National contended, on both statutory and policy grounds, that the federal district
court "should adjudicate the action, rather than the state court." Id.
122. Id. at 1104.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York, in Bank of New York v. Bank of America ("BNY"), 124 further
limited the reach of section 632 jurisdiction. In that case, Bank of New
York Australia ("BNYA"), an Australian corporation that is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the Bank of New York ("BNY"), entered into a
letter agreement with Bank of America Australia ("BOAA"), an
Australian corporation that is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bank of
America ("BOA"). Under this agreement, BNYA and BOAA
committed "to engage in exclusive negotiations for the.., possible sale
of BNYA's interest in several loans made by BNYA to a group of
Australian companies."']25
When the parties did not reach an agreement on the sale, 126 BOAA
and BOA filed suit in an Australian court1 27 and BNYA and BNY, in
turn, sued in the Supreme Court of the State of New York. 128 BOAA
and BOA removed the New York state action to the Southern District of
New York, alleging 12 U.S.C. § 632 as a basis for jurisdiction 129 and
maintaining that because the action stemmed "from a failed purchase of
loans by [BOA's] foreign subsidiary, it ar[ose] out of a transaction
involving foreign banking."' 130
The District Court for the Southern District of New York appeared to
utilize the same analysis as the Telecredit court in deciding whether
Edge Act jurisdiction applied to the dispute between BNYA/BNY and
BOAA/BOA. The BNY court examined the true nature of the
transaction and ultimately concluded that removal pursuant to section
632 was inappropriate because "[d]espite its appearance of having
123. Id. In addition to examining the true nature of the transaction in question to determine
whether the Edge Act conferred jurisdiction on the court to decide the case, the Telecredit court
also considered the undesirable results flowing from its grant of First National's request for the
removal of the case to federal court based on section 632, noting that "[o]ne could hardly say that
[a]... transaction involve[ed] international banking merely because the service being purchased
was to be consumed in a foreign land." Id. If the court granted First National's request for
removal, it reasoned that federal district courts everywhere would be required to extend Edge Act
jurisdiction to "every chargeback dispute involving a foreign product or service, consumed in the
United States by an American consumer, sold by an American corporation, simply because the
consumer purchased the product or service with her credit card." Id. Such a result would
"stretch[] the statute well beyond what Congress intended, and well beyond what has been
considered a traditional banking activity." Id.
124. Bank of N.Y. v. Bank of Am. (BNY), 861 F. Supp. 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
125. Id. at 227.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 232.
[Vol. 41
2010] The (Un)Constitutionality of Section 632 of the Edge Act 611
arisen from a failed banking transaction, the case is essentially
contractual and presents only the most elementary contract law issue:
Did the parties reach a binding agreement?" 131 In reality, it went one
step further, seemingly establishing a more stringent standard for the
application of Edge Act jurisdiction. Although it acknowledged that the
lawsuit arose "out of a failed loan purchase and sale transaction," 132 the
BNY court found that Edge Act jurisdiction did not extend to the case
because the claims involved in the suit were not "integrally tied to
banking activity, such that the court[] [was] required to consider and
apply principles of banking law to resolve them." 133  This finding
essentially mandated, as a prerequisite for section 632 jurisdiction, not
only the presence of a traditional banking activity, but also that this
banking activity "be legally significant in the case." 134
131. Id. at 233.
132. Id. at 232.
133. Id. at 232-33.
134. Id. at 233. As the BNY court itself stated, this kind of showing is not required by 12
U.S.C. § 632. See id. ("On its face, the statute only requires that a case arise out of a transaction
involving foreign banking. I interpret this, however, to mean that the banking aspect of the
jurisdictional transaction must be legally significant in the case."). It explained, however, that an
interpretation of the Edge Act suggesting "that a banking transaction need only appear
somewhere in the chain of causation-makes federal jurisdiction turn on chance rather than
substance. A purely contractual dispute over a failed loan sale would be a federal case, but the
same dispute involving a sale of repossessed automobiles would not." Id. Additionally, the court
in BNY noted that this more expansive interpretation "confers jurisdiction on virtually any case
where a bank is involved on account of the regular conduct of its business. Concededly, that is a
plausible reading of § 632, but if 'Congress had intended to reach all cases in which a bank is a
party ... it could have stated its intent more easily."' Id. (citing Diaz v. Pan Am. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 635 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1980)).
In Diaz, which-like the Telecredit and BNY decisions-narrowly construed section 632, the
plaintiff alleged that the defendant, Pan American Federal Savings and Loan Association ("Pan
American"), "maliciously or negligently caused a criminal prosecution to be instituted against
[the] plaintiff in a Puerto Rico court. The criminal charge alleged that [the] plaintiff had caused
to be circulated two checks drawn against [Pan American], for which there were insufficient
funds." Diaz, 635 F.2d at 31. The plaintiff subsequently "invoked federal jurisdiction under 12
U.S.C. § 632." Id. The district court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction and the First
Circuit affirmed, declining to read the term "banking transaction" so broadly as to encompass the
"filing of a criminal complaint based on the alleged passing of bad checks." Id. First, the Diaz
court noted that section 632 "is otherwise limited to cases arising from 'transactions' and 'other..
. financial operations' of banking institutions.... [T]his limited range of companion parts of the
same statutory section militates in favor of a similar narrow limitation for the term 'banking."'
Id. (citations omitted). Further, the court in Diaz noted that "a commonsense approach to a
statute principally concerned with financial transactions of an international character suggests that
'banking' includes only traditional banking activities." Id. at 31-32 (citations omitted). Thus, the
Diaz court held that "the filing of a criminal complaint as a result of plaintiffs alleged passing of
bad checks falls outside the scope of traditional banking and that the district court properly
dismissed." Id. at 32.
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C. Recent Case Law Further Broadening the Reach of Edge Act
Jurisdiction
Federal courts have recently broadened the reach of section 632 even
beyond the interpretations advanced in Juvenal Rosa and CVF. This
broadening has taken two forms. First, courts have started to treat the
previously seldom-used "arising... out of other international or foreign
financial operations" provision to function as a "catch-all," construing it
to supply a basis for federal jurisdiction in cases where (traditional)
banking transactions may not be clearly implicated. Additionally, they
have begun to read section 632 so expansively as to allow federal
question jurisdiction to extend to cases involving-in essence-only
state law claims (that arguably do not implicate the Edge Act) and
having no other basis for federal jurisdiction.
1. The Courts' Treatment of the Recently "Discovered" "International
or Foreign Financial Operations" Provision of Section 632 of the Edge
Act
Courts have ignored the "arising out of other international or foreign
financial operations" provision of the Edge Act until relatively
recently. 135 Several recent decisions have relied on this provision to
supply federal question jurisdiction under section 632, however, even
when the presence of banking transactions (as required by the first
provision of section 632) was marginal or essentially non-existent.
Thus, these decisions have treated the "international or foreign financial
operations" provision of section 632 as a broad "catch-all" provision.
The first recent case relying on and analyzing this provision to any
significant extent was In re Lloyd's American Trust Fund Litigation
("LATF"). 136  In LATF, the plaintiffs-underwriting members of
Lloyd's of London ("Lloyd's")-brought suit in New York state court
against Citibank, N.A., arguing "that Citibank [had] breached its duties
and responsibilities as the trustee of the trust fund of each plaintiff."'137
Citibank removed the action to federal court by way of section 632,
relying in part on the "other international or foreign financial
operations" provision. The plaintiffs moved to remand the case, relying
on Telecredit and BNY 138
135. A 1938 case from a New York district court was the only decision that examined and
generally dealt with this provision of section 632. See Travis v. Nat'l City Bank of N.Y., 23 F.
Supp. 363, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 1938) (finding section 632 jurisdiction because "the complaint
disclose[d] that the defendant was involved in foreign financial operations").
136. In re Lloyd's Am. Trust Fund. Litig. (IATF), 928 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
137. Id. at 335.
138. ld.at339-41.
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The LATF court not only held that, under the reasoning espoused by
Juvenal Rosa and CVF, 139 it had section 632 jurisdiction over the case
pursuant to the "transactions involving international or foreign banking"
provision, but it also relied on the "other international or foreign
financial operations" provision to reach the same conclusion regarding
federal question jurisdiction. 140  The LATF court defined "the phrase
'other international or foreign financial operations' . . . [to mean]
international or foreign financial operations other than banking."'14 1 It
then held that "[e]ven if the transactions in question . . . d[id] not
constitute banking proper, they [were] so close that they surely f[e]ll
within the ambit of the 'financial operations' contemplated by the [Edge
Act]." 142
Several recent cases have followed LATF, viewing the "other
international or foreign financial operations" provision as essentially a
"catch-all" that broadly supports a grant of federal jurisdiction under
section 632.143 In Clarken v. Citicorp Diners Club, Inc.,144 for
example, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois relied on LATF in holding that the "other international or foreign
financial operations" provision of section 632 provided federal
jurisdiction for the defendants' claims. 145  The Clarken court cited
139. Id. at340-41.
140. Id. at 341. In doing so, the court in LATF pointed out that "under [s]ection 632,
jurisdiction may be premised either on the presence in the case of 'transactions involving
international or foreign banking' or on the presence of 'international or foreign financial
operations."' Id. (citations omitted).
141. Id. (citations omitted); see also Stamm v. Barclays Bank of N.Y., No. 96-CV-
5158(SAS), 1996 WL 614087, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1996) (adopting the definition of this
provision as it was set out by the LATF court). This definition seems to suggest that the "other
international or foreign financial operations" provision of section 632 acts as a "catch-all" for
those cases that are not encompassed by the "transactions involving international or foreign
banking" provision, thus greatly broadening the reach of section 632 even beyond the realm of
banking. A subsequent decision by the district court for the Southern District of New York
provided a context for this broad definition, stating that "'financial operations' are commonly
understood as those operations that 'provide . . . capital or loan money as needed to carry on
business."' Stamm v. Barclays Bank of N.Y., 960 F. Supp. 724, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 568 (5th ed. 1979)).
142. LATF, 928 F. Supp. at 341.
143. Generally these decisions also analyze or at least mention the section 632 provision
concerning international or foreign banking transactions, but they make clear their reliance on the
second provision of section 632 regarding international or foreign financial operations in
ultimately reaching conclusions about the appropriateness of removal and the presence of federal
question jurisdiction under the Edge Act.
144. No. 01-C-5123, 2001 WL 1263366 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2001).
145. See id. at *2; see also Warter v. Boston Sec., S.A., No. 03-81026, 2004 WL 691787, at
*8-9 (internal quotations omitted) (concluding that Edge Act jurisdiction extended to the case
because the plaintiffs alleged "duties and conspiracies involving millions of dollars in allegedly
fake sales of securities" and therefore demonstrated the presence of foreign financial operations
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LATF for the proposition that section 632 "confers jurisdiction in cases
involving international or foreign financial operations even if they do
not concern banking."'146
Similarly, in Bank of America Corp. v. Lemgruber,147 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
Edge Act jurisdiction was appropriate under the "other international or
foreign financial operations" provision in a case that centered on a claim
for a breach of a stock purchase contract. 148 In reaching this decision,
the Lemgruber court explained that even though the Edge Act "does not
explicitly define 'other international or foreign financial operations,"' 149
the stock purchase, "regardless of whether it involved any traditional
banking activity, . . . satisfies the second requirement for Edge Act
jurisdiction as an 'international financial operation."' 1 50
2. The Federal Courts' Recent (and General) Broadening of Edge Act
Jurisdiction
The federal courts have recently used both provisions of section 632
to facilitate their consideration of cases that essentially involve pure
state law claims and provide no other basis for federal jurisdiction. The
approaches used by the courts in these cases to resolve the question of
Edge Act jurisdiction are neither internally consistent nor necessarily
and dismissing the argument that extending section 632 jurisdiction to the case "would open the
flood gate of litigation in the federal courts to all securities cases involving foreign brokers," as
the "mere presence of a foreign securities broker is insufficient to warrant federal jurisdiction
pursuant to the Edge Act ... [because] the Edge Act also requires the presence of a nationally
chartered bank as a condition of removal"); see also Pinto v. Bank One Corp., No. 02-CV-8477,
2003 WL 21297300, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2003) (holding, without any significant analysis of
the case's facts, that federal question jurisdiction under the Edge Act was available because the
"[t]he actions of the merchant bank, Bank of Bermuda Ltd., and any other foreign merchant banks
that acted to clear Pinto's charges through international credit card clearing facilities constitute[d]
financial operations under the Act") (emphasis added).
146. 2001 WL 1263366, at *2 (emphasis added).
147. 385 F. Supp. 2d 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
148. See id. at 215-16. This alleged breach "was accomplished in part through overdrafts and
inter-bank wire transfers of . . . [blank funds into the United States, fraudulent loans, and
purchases of bogus certificates of deposit." Id. at 215.
149. Id.at2l5n.13.
150. Id. (emphasis added); see also In re Lloyd's Am. Trust Fund. Litig. (LATF), 928 F. Supp.
333, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that Edge Act jurisdiction may be premised upon foreign
financial operations other than banking). By way of example, the court in Lemgruber noted that
Section 615 of the Act provides that one of the powers granted to Edge Act
corporations, which are organized specifically 'for the purpose of engaging in . . .
international or foreign financial operations,' is the power 'to purchase and hold stock
or other certificates of ownership in any other corporation organized ... under the laws
of any foreign country.
Lemgruber, 385 F. Supp. 2d at 215 n.13 (citations omitted) (citing 12 U.S.C. § 615).
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consistent with any one previously advanced interpretation (broad or
narrow) of section 632.
A primary example of these cases is Sollitt v. KeyCorp.151 In Sollitt,
the plaintiff alleged a single cause of action in his state court complaint:
wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy of the State of
Ohio. 152  Defendant KeyCorp sought to keep the case in federal court
solely on the basis of the Edge Act, 153 arguing that the case involved
international banking transactions because Sollitt contended that he was
terminated as a result of complaints he made about allegedly fraudulent
foreign exchange transactions, 154 and not because Sollitt was found to
have violated KeyCorp's computer and electronic communications
usage policy. 155 Sollitt, on the other hand, requested that the case be
remanded to state court because, based on the Diaz, Telecredit, and BNY
decisions, 156 his wrongful discharge claim did "not 'arise out' of
international or foreign banking activities."'
157
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
concluded that "'the banking aspect of the jurisdictional transaction [is]
legally significant in [this] case,' 158 and the [c]ourt therefore has federal
151. Sollitt v. KeyCorp, No. 1:09-CV-43, 2009 WL 367494, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2009).
152. Id. at *1. To prove the elements of this state law tort, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1)
the existence of a clear public policy that manifests itself in a state or federal constitution, statute
or administrative regulation, or in the common law; (2) the fact that the dismissal of employees
under circumstances like those involved in the plaintiff's dismissal would jeopardize the public
policy; (3) that the plaintiffs dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public policy; and
(4) that the employer lacked an overriding legitimate business justification for the dismissal. Id.
at *4 (citing Wiles v. Medina Auto Parts, 773 N.E.2d 526, 529-30 (Ohio 2002)).
153. See id. at*l.
154. See id. at *4.
155. Complaint at 8, Sollitn, 2009 WL 210606 (No. 1:09-CV-43).
156. See Plaintiff's Motion for Remand to the Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County,
Ohio at 7-9, Sollitt, 2009 WL 210608 (No. 1:09-CV-43); see also supra notes 113-34 and
accompanying text (describing the Diaz, Telecredit, and BNY decisions).
157. Sollitt argued that "the intricacies of the foreign currency transactions and practices about
which [he] expressed concerns [were] neither legally significant nor central to his wrongful
discharge claim." Plaintiffs Reply Brief in Support of the Motion for Remand at 1, Sollitt, 2009
WL 412580 (No. 1:09-CV-43). At one point the Defendant seemingly agreed with this
characterization, claiming that "Sollitt filed the lawsuit in retaliation for being fired and that
there's no evidence he complained about the alleged sales practices." Peter Krouse, Fired
Employee Sues Key Bank, Charging Unethical Practices, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Jan.
19, 2009, at B 1.
158. The Sollitt court noted that the case centered on "KeyCorp's foreign exchange banking
practices and transactions [because the plaintiff] argue[d] that these practices and transactions
were unlawful or otherwise improper while contending that his own actions were lawful and
proper." Sollitt, 2009 WL 367494, at *4. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that
KeyCorp "fraudulently induced its customer ... to pay an improper exchange rate on a March
2008 transactions, netting KeyCorp 'hundreds of thousands of dollars in additional profit on this
single transaction."' Id.
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question jurisdiction over this case pursuant to the Edge Act. ... 159
Moreover, the court suggested that the plaintiffs "state law claim of
wrongful discharge in violation of the state's public policy [was]
integrally tied to banking activity, such that the [court was] required to
consider and apply principles of banking law to resolve it.' 160
Edge Act jurisdiction should not have been extended to Sollitt under
the narrow interpretation of section 632 set out in Diaz, Telecredit, and
BNY, as "the true nature" 161 of the suit was an action for wrongful
termination under state law and this state law tort claim was not
"integrally tied to banking activity."'162 Edge Act jurisdiction in Sollitt
would even be inappropriate under the broad interpretation of section
632 advanced in Juvenal Rosa and CVF because both of these cases still
require the presence of a transaction involving banking as a prerequisite
for jurisdiction. 163 As Sollitt contended, however, there is no authority
demonstrating that the Edge Act extends to a state law wrongful
termination claim or that the firing of a bank employee for an alleged
159. Id. at *5 (quoting Bank of N.Y. v. Bank of Am. (BNY), 861 F. Supp. 225, 233 (S.D.N.Y.
1994)).
160. Id. at *4 (citing BNY, 861 F. Supp. at 232-33). Without an explanation, the court in
Sollitt posited that the determination of whether the plaintiff was discharged in violation of
Ohio's public policy would require the court to "delve deeply into the policies and practices of..
. KeyCorp with respect to its foreign exchange banking transactions and operations." Id. An
examination of the elements of this state law tort claim reveals no need for such an inquiry,
however, as the plaintiff in this case would merely need to show that he was discharged for being
a whistleblower and not because he did not comply with his employer's computer usage policy.
See supra note 152 (setting out the elements of a wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio's public
policy claim).
161. Telecredit Serv. Ctr. v. First Nat'l Bank of the Fla. Keys, 679 F. Supp. 1101, 1103 (S.D.
Fla. 1988).
162. BNY, 861 F. Supp. at 232-33. Principally, the Sollitt court would have to determine
whether the plaintiff was fired for being a whistle-blower; whether or not the employees that he
complained about actually acted improperly is a tangential issue with respect to this inquiry.
Thus, banking activity would not "be legally significant in the case." Id. at 233. As the plaintiff
noted, "it is not [the defendant's] foreign exchange business practices that are at issues in this
case, but [its] motivations in terminating [the plaintiffs] employment. The propriety of their
foreign exchange business dealings are, at best, a peripheral matter." Plaintiffs Motion for
Remand to the Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, Ohio at 10, Sollitt, 2009 WL 210608
(No. 1:09-CV-43).
163. In Juvenal Rosa the First Circuit ultimately determined the requirement that a claim arise
out of a transaction involving banking to fit within the meaning of section 632. See Conjugal
Soc'y Composed of Juvenal Rosa v. Chi. Title Ins. Co. (Juvenal Rosa), 690 F.2d 1, 5 (ist Cir.
1982) (Plaintiffs argued "they were denied rights provided by the guaranty and the performance
bond. Whether defendants' acts are viewed as ones in tort or contract, plaintiffs' rights are
alleged to have arisen out of defendants' mortgage agreements and thus out of a transaction
involving banking [under] section 632."). In CVF a traditional banking transaction was still
involved in the case-it was the presence of a federally charted bank that was the central
question. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
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public policy violation constitutes "banking."'
164
The First Circuit's decision in Burgos v. Citibank, N.A, 165 which held
that "the repossession of a vehicle following the borrower's default...
[was] simply 'part and parcel' of a customary banking activity in
consumer automobile loan activities," 166 constitutes a similar (and
glaring) example of the federal courts' recent broadening of section 632
jurisdiction to essentially encompass purely state law claims.1 67
At issue in Burgos was the plaintiff's claim-based originally on
164. See Plaintiffs Motion for Remand to the Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County,
Ohio at 10, Sollitt, 2009 WL 210608 (No. 1:09-CV-43).
165. 432 F.3d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 2005).
166. Id. at 49.
167. Another such case is Warter v. Boston Sec., S.A., No. 03-81026, 2004 WL 691787, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 22, 2004). In Warter, the plaintiffs sued several banks and individuals for
embezzling the plaintiffs' funds, which they had invested with Boston Securities, S.A. ("BSEC"),
an Argentine securities brokerage. See id. at *1. The plaintiffs had discovered that their
investment accounts "either did not exist or were inactive." Id. at *2. In the ensuing months, the
plaintiffs were alternatively told that "the money was safe in a neighboring country and that it
would be returned if they surrendered all BSEC account statements and papers ... [and that] they
should not say a word to anyone or all would be lost." Id. at *3. They also received threatening
phone calls during which the callers advised the plaintiffs to not speak to anyone about these
matters. See id. Moreover, after the plaintiffs wrote to BSEC's Massachusetts headquarters
demanding compensation for their losses, one of the banks involved with BSEC allegedly "used
this letter as a basis for filing a criminal complaint against [one of the plaintiffs] in Argentina." Id.
As a result, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the defendants in a Florida state court, alleging
fraud, negligence, fraudulent conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
conspiracy to commit fraud. See id. at *4. In turn, the defendants removed the matter to the
federal district court, arguing that the court had Edge Act jurisdiction over the case because it
involved international banking activities, such as the wiring and depositing of funds and the
receipt of "fraudulent investment advice in furtherance of [the] embezzle[ment of] funds." Id. at
*6. Arguing for remand, however, the plaintiffs alleged that their case was "entirely based on
[the] alleged embezzlement-which they claim[ed] [was] not a banking activity-and cite[d]
Diaz and Telecredit for the proposition that the mere presence of a bank or a banking transaction
is insufficient to confer Edge Act jurisdiction." Id. at *7.
The Warter court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments, however, reasoning that unlike the facts
underlying the claims in Diaz and Telecredit, "the facts underlying [the pilaintiffs' claims, wire
transfers, managing deposits, and providing investment advice, constitute banking activities.
That the Amended Complaint sounds in tort is no basis for discounting the centrality of banking
activity to this action." Id. The Warter court also held that even if the action did not involve
international banking activities, Edge Act jurisdiction still existed because the action involved
international financial operations. See supra note 145 (describing the treatment of this proposition
by the court in Warter).
Under the analysis used in Telecredit and BNY, however, the Warter court should have
determined that section 632 jurisdiction was inappropriate because the banking transactions were
not all central to the action; as the Warter court itself pointed out, the plaintiffs' complaint
involved only state law tort claims such as that for intentional infliction of emotional distress
arising out of the defendants' purported harassment of the plaintiffs. Certainly, the case would
not meet the BNY standard because the claims were not "integrally tied to banking activity, such
that the [Warter] court [would be] required to consider and apply principles of banking law to
resolve them." BNY, 861 F. Supp. 225,232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
618 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal [Vol. 41
diversity jurisdiction168-that Citibank violated the parties' conditional
sales agreement relating to the plaintiff's automobile purchase.' 69 The
First Circuit, "[w]ithout deciding whether the second claim-which
appear[ed] to allege the tort of malicious prosecution-ar[ose] out of a
traditional banking activity," 170 found that "the first claim-which
allege[d] a breach of contract-me[t] the section 632 criteria." 171 The
Burgos court seemingly analyzed the suit under Telecredit's narrow
interpretation of section 632 jurisdiction, stating that in evaluating the
applicability of the Edge Act, it would need "to determine the nature of
the transaction or activity giving rise to the alleged claims." 172 Despite
this analysis, the court in Burgos concluded that the contract at issue in
the case clearly arose out of a traditional banking activity because it
concerned "the parties' contractual agreement to repay a loan granted by
Citibank pursuant to a conditional sales contract for the vehicle, and the
respective rights of the parties vis-d-vis the vehicle." 173 In other words,
the court found section 632 jurisdiction even though the contract
concerned the sale of a vehicle. 174
The approach of the Burgos court is inconsistent with existing
interpretations of the Edge Act and internally incoherent in several
respects. First, it distinguished between the nature of the defendant's
acts and of the plaintiff's acts, suggesting that as long as the actions of
one of the parties arose out of a transaction involving banking within
168. The suit was originally not premised on the Edge Act. However, while the issue of
diversity jurisdiction "remained under advisement, the district court requested, sua sponte, that
the parties brief the issue as to whether 12 U.S.C. § 632 could constitute an independent basis for
subject matter jurisdiction." Burgos v. Citibank, N.A., 432 F.3d 46, 48 (1st Cir. 2005).
Following the briefing, the court ruled that diversity jurisdiction was inappropriate and that
"section 632 [was] not an autonomous basis for subject matter jurisdiction, given that the action
did not arise out of a 'traditional banking activity,' but merely from claims for malicious
prosecution and breach of contract." Id. (citations omitted).
169. See id. "Citibank financed the purchase of [the plaintiffs] automobile pursuant to a
conditional sales agreement. After [the plaintiff] defaulted on her payments under the agreement,
Citibank referred her account to a collection agency." Id. Although the collection agency entered
into a repayment agreement with the plaintiff, "Citibank notified local police that the automobile
was stolen, and the plaintiff was subpoenaed to appear at the police station. Upon her arrival, she
was placed under arrest and her automobile was confiscated." Id. The police eventually
dismissed the charges against the plaintiff for lack of probable cause and the automobile was
returned to the plaintiff. See id.
170. Id. at 49.
171. Id. (emphasis added).
172. Id. (citing Telecredit Serv. Ctr v. First Nat'l Bank of the Fla. Keys, 679 F. Supp. 1101,
1103 (S.D. Fla. 1988)).
173. Id.
174. In fact, the court explicitly stated that "[i]t cannot be disputed that the repayment contract
remained a contract relating to an automobile loan." Id. at 50.
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the meaning of section 632, Edge Act jurisdiction was appropriate. 175
Additionally, the court in Burgos seemed to construct its own
understanding of section 632, borrowing from both broad and narrow
readings of the Edge Act, by asserting that the necessarily broad
meaning of "arising out of' supplanted the narrow definition of
"traditional banking activity."'176 This understanding conveniently
supported the court's conclusion that "a successor lending agreement-
like the one in the instant case, whose subject matter remains the rights
of the parties under a conditional sales agreement-[does not possess]
an overly tenuous connection to traditional banking activities."' 177
D. Proposed Interpretation of Section 632 of the Edge Act
If the Edge Act is found to be constitutional, a new statutory-level
approach to understanding the provisions of section 632 will be
necessary to address the federal courts' recent broadening of Edge Act
jurisdiction to encompass cases that involve purely state law claims and
apparently contain no other Article III ground for jurisdiction. This
approach would also solve the other problems associated with the
federal courts' recent approach to section 632; their overbroad
interpretation transcends the purpose and intent of the Act, provides a
means for defendants to avoid satisfying the constitutional, statutory,
and judicial requirements for federal jurisdiction, encourages forum
shopping, and promotes inefficiencies in the judicial process.
To decide whether Edge Act jurisdiction exists in particular cases,
courts should adhere to an approach that combines the views of
Telecredit and BNY. Specifically, courts should first look to the "true
nature" of the transactions in question to determine whether they
175. "'Whether [defendant's] acts are viewed as ones in tort or contract, [plaintiffs] rights are
alleged to have arisen out of [defendant's] mortgage agreements and thus out of a transaction
involving banking within the meaning of section 632."' Id. at 49 (quoting Conjugal Soc'y
Composed of Juvenal Rosa v. Chi. Title Ins. Co. (Juvenal Rosa), 690 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1982)).
176. See id. at 49-50; see also United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Penuche's, Inc., 128 F.3d 28, 32 (1st
Cir. 1997) (noting that the concept of "arising out of' is broader than proximate causation).
Significantly, the phrase "arising out of' is only considered to be unquestionably broad in the
insurance law context. See Randall L. Smith & Fred A. Simpson, Causation in Insurance Law,
48 S. TEX. L. REV. 305, 307 n.8 (2006); Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationales in Insurance
Law: Dusting off the Formal for the Function, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1069 n.109 (1991)
(describing the liberal interpretation of the phrase "arising out of' in understanding insurance
coverage for automobile accidents). No such broad interpretation of this phrase has been
advanced in the banking context, not to mention in the context of section 632.
177. Burgos, 432 F.3d at 50. The Burgos court stubbornly stuck to its holding even though
immediately after making this statement, it acknowledged that it felt that the successor contract
may have triggered section 632 jurisdiction only because the original contract, which was not at
issue in the case, would have done so. Id. The court did not explain why Edge Act jurisdiction
could rest on the successor, as opposed to the original agreement. Id.
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constitute traditional banking transactions. In evaluating whether a
transaction is indeed traditional, courts should refer to a recognized list
of such activities, as they have been set out by Congress in another
statute: "loan[s], discount[s], deposit[s], or trust service[s].' 78
"[C]redit cards, insurance, underwriting of stocks and bonds, sale of
mutual funds, real estate transactions, and creation of various interstate
facilities" 179 would not constitute traditional banking activities,
however. This approach explains decisions like Telecredit, where the
court found that the implicated transactions were credit card-related
charges and declined to extend section 632 jurisdiction as a result.
Second, even if a case implicates a traditional banking activity, courts
should determine whether the activity is central to the case "such that
the court [is] required to consider and apply principles of banking law to
resolve them." 180 In other words, the traditional banking activity must
"be legally significant in the case." 181  Although, as the BNY court
acknowledged, this requirement is not grounded in the language of 12
U.S.C. § 632, it follows from the suggested intent of section 632 of the
Edge Act:182 section 632 was meant to (1) prevent "inconsistent state
178. 12 U.S.C. § 1972(l)(C) (2006); Timothy D. Naegele, The Anti-Tying Provision: Its
Potential is Still There, 100 BANKING L.J. 138, 141 (1983) ("Congress provided a limited
exemption in [s]ection 1972 for transactions exclusively involving four so-called traditional
banking services-specifically, loans, discounts, deposits, or trust services."); see also Stephen J.
Friedman & Connie M. Friesen, A New Paradigm for Financial Regulation: Getting From Here
to There, 43 MD. L. REv. 413, 451 (1984) ("Yet it is clear that when major banks have found
themselves in trouble in recent years, it has been because of traditional banking activities-real
estate loans, energy loans, loans to developing countries, and government securities activities-
not because of securities transactions or other exotic activities."); Bruce L. Rockwood, Interstate
Banking and Nonbanking in America: A New Recipe for an Old Prescription or Why Does the
Elephant Banker Wear Tennis Shoes and Waterwings, and Carry an Economist Pocket Diary?,
12 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 137, 140 n.3 (1989) (stating that the markets traditionally reserved for
banks include "checking and savings plans, and commercial and mortgage lending").
179. Rockwood, supra note 178, at 140 n.3.
180. Bank of N.Y. v. Bank of Am. (BNY), 861 F. Supp. 225,232-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
181. Id. at233.
182. The Supreme Court and legal scholars have held out consideration of a statute's intent as
an important factor in gleaning the proper interpretation of the statute. See Philbrook v. Glodgett,
421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) ("Our objective in a case [turning on the interpretation of a statute] is to
ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the legislative will."); Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) ("[A] thing may be within the letter of the
statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers."); Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Order in Multiplicity: Aristotle on Text, Context, and the Rule
of Law, 79 N.C. L. REv. 577, 587 (2001) (explaining that in light of the "common law tradition,.
. interpretive techniques that began with the text of the statute [have) employed ... a 'soft' plain
meaning approach, emphasizing the statute's purpose and ... policy, a method ... closer to...
common law ... adjudication than ... focus[ing] on the statutory text alone." In other words,
according to this approach, "the statute's 'plain meaning' can be trumped by contradictory
legislative history because the sole task of any judge interpreting a given statute is simply to give
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court interpretations of the Federal Reserve Act and accompanying
regulations;" 183 (2) recognize "that federal reserve banks were deemed
citizens of no state and thus could not remove cases against them to
federal court on diversity grounds;"' 184 and (3) recognize that "the
extension of federal jurisdiction over federal reserve banks was based
on [an understanding] of the central role the federal reserve banks
played in the nation's economy and their actions as fiscal agents and
sub-treasuries for the federal government." 185 Accordingly, cases that
do not require courts to interpret the Federal Reserve Act and other
banking regulations or that do not implicate the central role of banks do
not merit Edge Act jurisdiction. 186
Just as the first provision of section 632-implicating civil suits
arising out of "transactions involving international or foreign
banking"-should be narrowly construed, so should the second, which
concerns civil suits arising "out of other international or foreign
financial operations." To do otherwise essentially negates the narrow
interpretation of the first provision and reinforces the recent trend of
using the second provision as a broad "catch-all."
In particular, Congress likely intended a narrow construction for both
provisions of section 632.187 As a result, the term "financial
effect to the legislature's intent in enacting the statute"); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper:
The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States
Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277, 301-02 (1990) (stating that judges should always seek to
understand a statute's intent because the text is rarely clear).
183. Fed. Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220 F.3d 1235, 1241 (11 th Cir. 2000) (citing
People ex rel. Cosentino v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., 579 F. Supp. 1261, 1265 (N.D. I11. 1984)).
184. Id. (citing Cosentino, 579 F. Supp. at 1265).
185. Id. at 1241-42 (citing Cosentino, 579 F. Supp. at 1265).
186. Further support for a narrow interpretation of section 632 comes from the fact that one
potential reason for its enactment, the rule established in Bankers' Trust that diversity jurisdiction
is not available to corporations, is no longer applicable. See supra note 99 and accompanying
text (descr'bing this rule). Corporations (or banks) are now able to bring suits as citizens in
federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2005). See supra note 99. Thus, the Act is no longer
the only vehicle into federal court for lawsuits filed by or against banks.
187. The presence of the phrase "other international or foreign financial operations" in section
632 parallels its inclusion in the statute providing for federal incorporation of organizations (Edge
Act "corporations") that would engage in "international or foreign banking or other international
or foreign financial operations." 12 U.S.C. § 611 (1991). Through the establishment of such
corporations, as well as through the adoption of the Edge Act,
Congress intended not only to encourage United States exports, but also to use
American capital to help rebuild war-devastated Europe. Congress specifically
expected Edge Corporations to act as merchant banks, taking equity and long-term debt
interests in European enterprises. Thus .... Edge Corporations were granted broad
banking powers, including such banking and financial operations as the Fed might
determine to be usual abroad where the Edge Corporation was conducting its business.
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operations" would, at most, include a slightly broader range of
traditional banking activities. 188 Furthermore, even if it is considered to
be a "catch-all," the second provision of section 632 should not be read
broadly; courts generally construe "catch-all" provisions narrowly. 189
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EDGE ACT
Even more important than the proper statutory interpretation of the
Edge Act is the broader or constitutional analysis of the Act. Courts
have been neglecting this constitutional analysis, which would require
them to explore the limits of Article IH. Particularly during this time of
financial uncertainty and bank failures, when issues concerning the
(federal) jurisdiction of lawsuits against or implicating banks and other
financial institutions come to the fore, courts must evaluate and resolve
the question of the constitutionality of the Edge Act.
Section 632 of the Edge Act is likely unconstitutional because it does
not fit within the traditional framework of federal question jurisdiction
set out in Article III. Additionally, none of the three recognized
theories of "protective jurisdiction" fully apply to the Edge Act; even if
one did, the Supreme Court has not yet legitimized protective
jurisdiction and it does not appear that it will do so in the near future.
The text of section 632 suggests that the Act's jurisdiction reaches
beyond that of Article 1I. Specifically, the Act provides that
Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, Thinking the Unthinkable: What Should Commercial Banks or Their
Holding Companies be Allowed to Own?, 67 IND. L.J. 251, 257 (1992).
188. See Racepoint Partners, LLC v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, No. 06-CIV-2500-2501 (MGC),
2006 WL 2044416, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2006) ("The phrase 'financial operations' in
[s]ection 632 is read according to its usual meaning."); see also Bank of Am. Corp v. Lemgruber,
385 F. Supp. 2d 200, 215 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that the "common meaning" of "finance"
is "to supply with funds through the issuance of stocks, bonds, notes or mortgages"); Stamm v.
Barclays Bank of N.Y., 960 F. Supp. 724, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that "financial
operations" are "commonly understood as" those operations that "provide ... capital or loan
money as needed to carry on business").
189. See P.J.M. Declercq, Modem Analysis of the Legal Effect of Force Majeure Clauses in
Situations of Commercial Impracticability, 15 J.L. & COM. 213, 234 (1995). In addition, the
ejusdem generis canon of construction requires "that when a general word or phrase follows a list
of specifics, the general word or phrase will be interpreted to include only items of the same type
as those listed." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (8th ed. 2004). See also Hall Street Assocs.,
LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 586 (2008) (stating that under ejusdem generis, "when a
statute sets out a series of specific items ending with a general term, that general term is confined
to covering subjects comparable to the specifics it follows"); John F. Decker, Addressing
Vagueness, Ambiguity, and Other Uncertainty in American Criminal Laws, 80 DENV. U. L. REV.
241, 261 (2002) (explaining that one of the five established principles of statutory interpretation
includes the notion that "catch-all phrases are limited by the rule of ejusdem generis (Latin for 'of
the same kind') which [confines] interpretation to a common theme or factor").
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all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity to which any
corporation organized under the laws of the United States shall be a
party, arising out of transactions involving international or foreign
banking or banking in a dependency or insular possession of the
United States, or out of other international or foreign financial
operations . 0 . shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United
States .... 190
The phrase "all suits" appears to include suits between non-diverse
parties that would be controlled by state law. Taking aside the
admonition of the Edge Act, such suits would not generally arise under
federal law. 191 Thus, the Edge Act seems to exceed the bounds of
Article III "arising under" jurisdiction.
Only one federal court has evaluated the constitutionality of the Edge
Act under Article III. In A.L Trade Finance, Inc. v. Petra International
Banking Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, as part of determining whether it had jurisdiction over a case
concerning a "suit to hold an Edge Act corporation liable upon the
controlling bank's guaranty of negotiable instruments," 192 had to decide
"whether the jurisdiction contemplated by [section] 632 is within 'the
judicial Power of the United States,' and thus within the constitutional
power of the Congress to confer upon the federal courts." 193  This
jurisdictional inquiry was prompted both by the court's need to establish
whether it had jurisdiction over the case and by its desire to determine
applicable choice-of-law rules. 194 Ultimately, the court concluded that
"there is enough substantive federal law underlying the grant of
jurisdiction in [section] 632 to render it constitutional," 195 stating that
"[t]he Edge Act regime is unquestionably a valid exercise of the
Congress's [enumerated Article I] powers . . . , and its substance lies
close enough to the heart of any case involving an international
transaction with an Edge Act bank to sustain the assertion of federal
subject-matter jurisdiction."' 196 It found that Congress has the power to
190. 12 U.S.C. § 632 (1991) (emphasis added).
191. Cf. Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 935 (explaining that federal courts would not have
jurisdiction over suits to enforce state claims involving the FDIC if not for a federal statute
similar to the Edge Act).
192. A.I. Trade Fin., Inc. v. Petra Int'l Banking Corp., 62 F.3d 1454, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing FW/PBS Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990)).
195. Id. at 1463 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 1462-63 (emphasis added). The court relied on the Osborn decision in supporting
this statement, noting that
[a]s in Osborn, where it was enough for federal jurisdiction that the Bank's ability to
enter into a transaction depended upon the terms of its federal charter, an issue of
federal law might well arise in a suit involving a foreign or international banking
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prevent divergent outcomes in the state courts of last resort by
extending federal question jurisdiction to such cases. 19 7
The decision in A.L Trade Finance demonstrates the questionable
relationship between Article III and the Edge Act, particularly in light
of current decisions implicating section 632. First, A.L Trade Finance
relies on Osborn's "original ingredient" theory to support section 632's
grant of federal question jurisdiction while the Supreme Court has
continued to retreat from Osborn's expansive understanding of Article
III "arising under" jurisdiction. 198  Second, this case seems to suggest
that Edge Act jurisdiction is within the bounds of Article III because the
Act's "regime" is a valid exercise of Congress's power under Article I,
Section 8; this argument implicates Wechsler's theory of protective
jurisdiction, which is the most broad and likely the most tenuous and
constitutionally problematic of the three protective jurisdiction
theories. 199  Third, the concerns described by A.L Trade Finance in
support of Edge Act jurisdiction, such as divergent outcomes with
respect to cases involving international transactions, are simply not
evinced in many current cases invoking section 632 jurisdiction. As
described above, these cases almost uniformly have non-diverse parties
and involve pure state law claims, and not the application of a scheme
of federal banking regulations. 200
transaction of an Edge Act corporation.
Id. at 1463 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
197. Id.
198. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. Congress and the Supreme Court have
narrowly construed the Constitution's limited grant of federal question jurisdiction. See U.S.
CONST. art. 1i, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority .... "); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1980) ("The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States."); F. Andrew Hessick IlI, The Common Law of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 60
ALA. L. REv. 895, 928-29 (2009) ("[T]he historical tenor of the Court's opinions ha[s] been
against finding jurisdiction, as is reflected in the narrow constructions of not only the federal
question statute[,] but other jurisdictional statutes as well."); see also Romero v. Int'l Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 (1959) (noting the "deeply felt and traditional reluctance of this
Court to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts through a broad reading of jurisdictional
statutes").
199. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text for a description of Wechsler's theory; see
also Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction. A General Statutory
and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 743, 809-10 (2000) (arguing that "[t]o the
extent protective jurisdiction relies solely upon Congress's Article I powers, it rings
inharmoniously with the conventional wisdom that the Framers intended Article III as both the
source and limits of the federal judicial power" and suggesting that this version of protective
jurisdiction theory "does not respond to the concern that Article 1H was designed to restrain the
federal judicial power").
200. See supra Part ILI.C.2. Additionally, the federal courts' current treatment of cases that
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None of the three theories of protective jurisdiction legitimize Edge
Act jurisdiction, thereby remedying its impermissible expansion of
Article III. Wechsler's, and, to a much lesser extent, Mishkin's theories
could potentially support the extension of federal question jurisdiction
under the Edge Act because Congress could (and has, to some degree)
exercised its powers in the field of international banking.20 1 However,
both of these theories have been criticized by scholars including
Goldberg-Ambrose. 202
Perhaps more importantly, regardless of the applicability of Wechsler
and Mishkin's theories to the Edge Act, the Supreme Court has rejected
the application of protective jurisdiction generally and with respect to a
statute that is remarkably similar to section 632.203 In Mesa v.
California, the Court held that "a pure jurisdictional statute, seeking to
do nothing more than grant district court jurisdiction over cases in
which a federal officer is a defendant. . . cannot independently support
Art. I 'arising under' jurisdiction." 204 The Court indicated that Article
III jurisdiction would be supported only if the officer raised a federal
question in her removal petition.20 5
Just like the statute involved in Mesa, section 632 is a "pure
jurisdictional statute" that does "nothing more than grant district court
jurisdiction over cases" 206 in which a corporation organized under the
laws of the United States is a party. Thus, section 632 cannot, as it
were removed based on the alleged presence of Edge Act jurisdiction contradicts the purported
intent of section 632 (which the A.L Trade Finance court apparently desired to uphold), allows a
number of "borderline" cases or suits that have no federal claims and essentially no basis for
federal jurisdiction to be considered by the federal courts, contradicts the narrow construction of
federal jurisdiction advanced and adhered to by the Constitution, Congress, and the Supreme
Court, and promotes inefficiencies in the judicial process by requiring federal courts to wade
through unfamiliar law and arguments to resolve cases that should not have been on their dockets
in the first place, thereby involuntarily encroaching on the province of the state courts.
201. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text. This would assume that recent section
632 case law actually concerned international banking-a shaky assumption at present.
202. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
203. See supra notes 68-81 and accompanying text (explaining the Court's treatment of
protective jurisdiction generally and under the FSIA); see also Michael P. Allen, A Survey and
Some Commentary on Federal "Tort Reform," 39 AKRON L. REV. 909, 935 n.122 (2006) (citing
Mesa and Verlinden for the proposition that the Supreme Court "has refused to squarely hold
whether 'protective jurisdiction' is constitutionally permissible" and noting that "academic
opinions have been mixed concerning the constitutionality of this means of conferring federal
court jurisdiction," with some commentators arguing that protective jurisdiction is not "a valid
means by which Congress can confer jurisdiction"); Bellia, supra note 15, at 342, n.324
(indicating that the Supreme court has refrained from adopting theories of protective jurisdiction).
204. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121,136 (1989).
205. See id.
206. Id.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
currently stands, "independently support Art. I1. 'arising under'
jurisdiction;" without the presence of a separate federal question-a
federal defense was required in Mesa-the statute raises "grave
constitutional problems." 207  Moreover, just as the application of
protective jurisdiction could not support a purely jurisdictional
understanding of the statute at issue in Mesa because this approach
would not be constitutionally sound under Article HI,20 8 protective
jurisdiction also cannot salvage a purely jurisdictional statute like
section 632.209
In light of Article III and the Supreme Court's negative treatment of
protective jurisdiction and of "pure jurisdictional statutes," section 632
of the Edge Act is likely unconstitutional or, at the very least, its current
application by the federal courts raises not only statutory-level
questions, but also "grave constitutional questions." Federal courts
should not be required to extend federal question jurisdiction to cases
that neither involve contested issues of federal law nor satisfy the
requirements for the application of protective jurisdiction.210 Yet, this
is exactly what the Edge Act now asks federal courts to do.
V. CONCLUSION
The federal courts' recent interpretation and application of section
632 of the Edge Act have created issues of statutory interpretation and
constitutional problems. The Act, which places all civil suits arising out
of "transactions involving international or foreign banking" or "out of
other international or foreign financial operations" in the federal courts,
has recently been interpreted to essentially establish federal question
jurisdiction over cases with non-diverse parties and involving purely
state law claims. More importantly, the Edge Act-both generally and
as it is now being used-is likely unconstitutional because it does not fit
within the traditional framework of federal question jurisdiction set out
in Article HI and it cannot be supported by theories of protective
207. Id. at 137. In Verlinden, however, the Court held that such a federal question was
necessarily present in every case brought under the FSIA because that statute was not purely
jurisdictional, and included a comprehensive scheme which required courts to resolve whether the
foreign state has immunity. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983).
208. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (1996)).
209. The same reasons for rejecting the application of protective jurisdiction in Mesa apply to
the Edge Act. In Mesa, "no state court hostility or interference ha[d] even been alleged by
petitioners ... " and no federal interests would be left unprotected if removal were unavailable or
limited to situations in which a separate federal question were alleged. Mesa, 489 U.S. 121 at
137-38.
210. See William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise
"Directly" Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 890, 891 (1967).
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jurisdiction or upheld in light of the Supreme Court's rulings in this
sphere of the law.
The constitutionality of the Edge Act (and of its proper statutory
interpretation, if it is deemed to be constitutional) is a particularly vital
legal question during periods of financial uncertainty and bank failures,
when issues concerning the federal jurisdiction of lawsuits against or
implicating banks and other financial institutions come to the fore.
Federal courts must confront these issues now in order to bring clarity
and predictability to this murky area of the law.
